The document distinguishes good offices and personal mediation from a mandate, military action and material support. The conditions attached to the offer are part of the text.
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your cabled message,[34] setting forth the resolution adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations, requesting the Council of the League to arrive at an understanding with the governments with a view to entrusting a power with the task of taking necessary measures to stop the hostilities in Armenia.
You offer to the United States the opportunity of undertaking the humanitarian task of using its good offices to end the present tragedy, being enacted in Armenia, and you assure me that your proposal involves no repetition of the invitation to accept a mandate for Armenia.
While the invitation to accept a mandate for Armenia has been rejected by the Senate of the United States, this country has repeatedly declared its solicitude for the fate and welfare of the Armenian people, in a manner and to an extent that justifies you in saying that the fate of Armenia has always been of special interest to the American people.
I am without authorization to offer or employ military forces of the United States in any project for the relief of Armenia, and any material contributions would require the authorization of the Congress which is not now in session and whose action I could not forecast. I am willing, however, upon assurances of the moral and diplomatic support of the principal powers, and in a spirit of sympathetic response to the request of the Council of the League of Nations, to use my good offices and to proffer my personal mediation through a representative whom I may designate, to end the hostilities now being waged against the Armenian people and to bring peace and accord to the contending parties, relying upon the Council of the League of Nations to suggest to me the avenues through which my proffer should be conveyed and the parties to whom it should be addressed.
The troop totals, population estimates and threat assessment are the War Department’s contemporary proposals and estimates. They do not establish that troops were authorised or deployed.
My Dear Mr. Secretary: In reply to your letter of May 26, 1920,[27] requesting the views of the War Department as to the strength of the American forces of occupation that would be needed for the successful carrying out of a mandate for Armenia, I beg to inclose herewith a memorandum which embodies the views of the Department upon this subject.
1. The report of General Harbord, Chief of the American Military Mission to Armenia,[28] contemplated that Trans-Caucasia and the whole of the former Turkish Empire, less Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia, would be included in the terms of a single mandate. For this territory General Harbord proposed an initial Ameriican force of occupation of 59,000 men, to be reduced subsequently by about 50 per cent as a result of the organization of a native constabulary.
2. The area of the proposed state of Armenia is from 55,000 to 60,000 square miles, or about one-sixth of the area considered by General Harbord. Its population is estimated as approximately 3,000,000.
3. The War Department is of the opinion that pending the organization of a native constabulary, an American force of occupation of the following strength and composition, would be sufficient to insure domestic order in Armenia, and to protect its frontiers against the incursions of irregular or unorganized forces from adjacent territories, viz;
4. As a result of the organization of native constabulary, it should be possible to reduce the above force substantially by the end of two years, and to about 10,000 men by the end of the third year.
5. As to organized external aggressions against Armenia, if the League of Nations functions in accordance with the terms of the Covenant, the protection of Armenia against such aggressions will devolve upon all the member states of the League. In any event it may be said that it will be impracticable to maintain in Armenia American forces of occupation of such size as to insure the protection of that state against invasions in force. At present the greatest danger in this respect is that offered by the Bolshevists. A Bolshevist force of from 65,000 to 75,000 men has been advancing southward through the Caucasus and has recently occupied Baku, and in newspaper dispatches of this date is reported to have entered Russian Armenia.
