"Hayk's Arrow" Armenian Strategic Center
Georgia’s economic relevance to Armenia extends beyond its market size: financial conditions, external demand and foreign-currency exposure shape a neighbouring economy through which Armenian businesses also reach wider markets.
Georgia’s economic relevance to Armenia extends beyond its market size: financial conditions, external demand and foreign-currency exposure shape a neighbouring economy through which Armenian businesses also reach wider markets. This collection concentrates on the National Bank’s dated macroeconomic evidence. It distinguishes observed balance-sheet and payments data from conditional forecasts, and treats each release as a historical observation rather than a permanently current value.
A common 2025 WDI frame separates the composition of output, employment and expenditure. Reported national-account shares and ILO modeled employment shares answer different questions; they are shown separately.
| Indicator | Value and reference period |
|---|---|
| Agriculture, forestry and fishing: value addedSector value added as a share of GDP; a composition measure, not a sector growth rate. | 5.2 % of GDP2025Reported result[163] |
| Industry, including construction: value addedIncludes mining, manufacturing, construction and utilities; manufacturing is a subset, not an additional sector to add. | 18.6 % of GDP2025Reported result[164] |
| Manufacturing: value addedManufacturing value added divided by GDP; excludes mining and is contained within the industry aggregate. | 8.0 % of GDP2025Reported result[165] |
| Services: value addedServices value added divided by GDP. Major sector shares need not sum to 100 because GDP includes taxes and other accounting adjustments. | 63.9 % of GDP2025Reported result[166] |
| Employment in agricultureILO modeled share of total employment in agriculture; it is not a national household-survey count or a measure of hours worked. | 34.0 % of total employment2025Estimate[167][172][173] |
| Employment in industryILO modeled sector share of employment, including construction. Different output and employment denominators cannot establish a wage or productivity ranking. | 16.6 % of total employment2025Estimate[168][172][173] |
| Employment in servicesILO modeled share of total employment in services; no conclusion about formality, job quality or earnings follows from the share alone. | 49.5 % of total employment2025Estimate[169][172][173] |
| Gross capital formationIncludes fixed capital, inventories and valuables. It is broader than fixed investment and is not the FDI inflow or proof of investment efficiency. | 21.3 % of GDP2025Reported result[170] |
| Exports of goods and servicesNational-accounts exports of goods and services relative to GDP; not customs-only goods exports or Armenian domestic value added embodied in exports. | 47.4 % of GDP2025Reported result[171] |
Georgia’s service-heavy output composition is relevant to Armenia’s operating commercial relationship with its northern neighbour. Yet the services aggregate combines activities with very different customers, skills and exposure, so it cannot identify an Armenian export opportunity by itself. The relatively large modeled agriculture employment share also warns against equating national service growth with uniform household gains. Armenian proposals for joint service work or supplier matching should begin with a paid assignment and a defined capability, while local agricultural opportunities require their own buyer and logistics evidence. [166][169][167]
Georgia’s exports-to-GDP ratio includes services, while the existing bilateral goods series follows customs reporting and can include re-exports. The two answer different questions and must not be merged into a single market-size claim for Armenian producers. Capital formation likewise does not identify which road, terminal or private investment is open to an Armenian user. For decisions, follow the complete transaction: origin, contractual access, payment timing and Armenian value retained. The common-year structure provides context for those tests without replacing firm-level evidence or current access terms. [171][170]
The WDI vintage is 8 October 2026. Manufacturing is already included in industry; sector value-added shares need not sum to 100. The employment split is modeled and must not be substituted for a national labour-force survey. Dividing an output share by an employment share would not, without compatible prices, hours and coverage, establish a cross-country productivity or wage ranking. ILO models combine reported and imputed observations and may retain an older employment definition where changing standards would create a break. The exact model-to-survey reconciliation has not been established here; treat labour comparisons as qualified, not a ranking of national labour-market performance. Georgia’s national LFS changed standards in 2020 and excludes non-market own-consumption agricultural producers from self-employment. This is a documented comparability issue, not proof that the entire numerical gap is caused by that change. [164][165][167][170][172][173]
Armenia should treat Georgia as an operating commercial relationship whose value depends on cash collected and Armenian production retained, rather than use Georgian growth as a sales forecast.
Armenia should treat Georgia as an operating commercial relationship whose value depends on cash collected and Armenian production retained, rather than use Georgian growth as a sales forecast. The NBG's February 2026 assessment describes healthy banking capital and liquidity; it does not establish the payment quality of an individual distributor. The immediate decision is therefore whether existing contract terms expose a participating Armenian firm to avoidable financing or currency costs. That can be answered from invoices before public resources are committed to market expansion. [20][159]
Reviewing a real receivable is a stronger first step than launching another promotion round: it is within the firm's control, creates a baseline and can reveal whether more orders would increase earnings or only tie up working capital. This ranking is conditional. Where payment is timely, currencies match and margins already cover financing, the case for tighter terms disappears; the distributor-backed order trial should then take precedence. [20][159]
Proposed horizons run from authorisation. Later stages depend on the conditions below; these are analytical choices, not adopted deadlines or funding commitments.
In the proposed first 90 days, willing firms and their banks should compare existing invoices, payment delays and currency mismatches with the priced alternatives already listed in the credit recommendation. Record the cost of lost sales as well as reduced exposure. Keep commercially sensitive records with the firms; public agencies need only aggregated evidence of a shared obstacle. [20][159]
Over the proposed 3–12 months, use the resulting delivered-margin baseline to test a small distributor-backed order and, where a paying client exists, a joint service assignment. Compare repeat paid demand with the existing business, including returns, staff time and travel. Georgian partners must accept their own commercial responsibilities before a joint trial begins. [159][154]
Beyond 12 months, consider supplier-matching support only where paid procurement shows a capability Armenian firms can retain. Scale the successful relationship, not the number of participating companies. If evidence shows re-export turnover without Armenian upgrading, preserve normal commerce but do not use that turnover to justify an industrial-support programme. [159][154]
The binding constraint is commercial information and implementation capacity, not a demonstrated shortage of another public fund. Small firms may lack reliable cost accounts or bargaining power to change terms, and stricter payment requirements can transfer the sale to a competitor. Any shared assistance needs a defined staff allocation and operating budget; the cited macroeconomic evidence supplies neither a grant entitlement nor a customer guarantee. [20][154]
A credible alternative is to retain existing credit terms and prioritise the export-order trial. That is preferable when receivables are well performing and the actual bottleneck is finding a repeat buyer. Conversely, if a firm cannot establish its delivered margin or finance another ordering cycle, postpone expansion and repair its contract or cost model first. These choices should be made firm by firm, without treating Georgian customers as a uniform risk class. [159][20]
Georgia’s preliminary 2025 statistics record US$233.1 million of imports from Armenia and US$552.9 million of exports to Armenia. These Georgian-reporter values establish a substantial trading relationship, but re-exports mean turnover is not equivalent to Armenian production income. For Armenian firms, the transmission runs through distributors’ orders, inventory finance and the reliability of delivery. A Georgian wholesaler can expand an Armenian producer’s market without requiring that producer to relocate. Conversely, weak sell-through or financing pressure can abruptly reduce replenishment. The practical opportunity is to identify repeat final demand and retain Armenian production, service and distribution margins rather than reward gross shipment value. [159]
Georgia’s 2025 national accounts show faster growth in information and communication than in manufacturing, while its 2026 payments data show substantial computer and transport receipts. Armenian specialists could therefore serve Georgian clients, join regional delivery teams or purchase Georgian logistics. The same expansion can bid skilled labour away from Armenian employers. Whether Armenia gains depends on where work, training and intellectual property remain, not the nationality of a project’s invoice. The older World Bank firm and skills studies identify scaling and matching problems; they support testing employer-led partnerships, but do not establish current vacancies or prove that a particular course will lead to employment. [154][3][157][158]
Georgian monetary tightening and external price pressure affect Armenian trade through customer financing and the cost of inventory, transport and settlement. A dollar invoice protects an Armenian seller’s nominal dollar revenue while transferring exchange pressure to a lari-earning buyer; longer payment terms shift credit risk back to the seller. Georgia’s reserve cushion improves systemic resilience but does not guarantee payment by an individual distributor. Armenian firms therefore need contract-level choices on invoicing, deposits and credit limits. These choices should reflect actual cash flows and bank quotations, not a forecast of the lari or an assumption that strong Georgian GDP growth removes counterparty risk. [1][15][2][5]
Adjusted Georgian FDI in 2024 relied heavily on reinvested earnings, with finance taking a large share. This points to established businesses strengthening operations, rather than an equivalent value of newly built factories. Armenian policy can use that distinction to seek supplier contracts with functioning firms instead of subsidising speculative relocation. There is also a fiscal connection: Georgian transport and energy enterprises influence Armenian costs, while their maintenance and financing needs persist after construction. For Armenia, commercial due diligence should therefore combine a customer’s actual procurement needs with the continued availability of infrastructure services. Announced investment alone is a weak basis for committing Armenian public support. [155][156][157]
Georgia entered autumn 2026 with strong activity alongside a renewed external price shock. The National Bank reported preliminary growth averaging 7.6 percent in January–August, including 6.3 percent in August. Its October assessment raised the full-year growth forecast to 7.2 percent; that forecast is distinct from the already observed eight-month result. [1]
For Armenian businesses, stronger Georgian demand can expand sales and service partnerships, while rapid growth in skilled activities can increase competition for specialists. The transmission is through orders, wages and financing, not simply parallel GDP growth. Productive Georgian firms can become suppliers or distribution partners, but the sectoral pattern determines which Armenian activities gain. [45][73][76][82]
The longer view explains why the current expansion is unusually service-intensive. The 2025 national accounts put information and communication growth at 28.7 percent and transport at 8.9 percent, against manufacturing growth of 3.9 percent and agriculture’s 5.7 percent contraction. Manufacturing still generated GEL8.35 billion at current prices. Armenia therefore faces a neighbour with substantial production alongside faster digital and logistics activities; regional demand for industrial inputs need not track the much faster software economy. [154]
The October 2026 policy decision kept the rate at 8.25 percent against September annual inflation of 5.6 percent. Energy contributed about two percentage points. Core inflation was 3.5 percent and services inflation 3.7 percent, below the headline measure. The contrast indicates why the bank distinguished imported supply pressure from broader domestic price persistence. [1]
Imported fuel and shipping pressures can raise the costs of Georgian transport, hospitality and suppliers used by Armenian customers. A firmer policy rate can also affect inventory finance and investment. This makes the combination of energy prices, the lari exchange rate and borrowing costs more relevant for bilateral business than any one inflation headline. [18][21][25][26]
The historical policy record includes the pandemic’s disruption of tourism and foreign inflows, followed by later decisions separating imported inflation from domestic demand. Georgia’s floating exchange rate provides an adjustment channel, but dollarised contracts distribute that adjustment unevenly. An Armenian exporter invoicing in dollars may preserve its dollar price while its Georgian customer’s purchasing power weakens; a lari-priced contract transfers more exchange risk to the exporter. This is a bilateral pricing mechanism, not a prediction of depreciation. [73][1][25][26]
In the second quarter of 2026 the current-account deficit was US$145.2 million, or 1.4 percent of quarterly GDP. A US$1.6 billion goods deficit coexisted with a US$1.1 billion services surplus. Computer and information services exports reached US$400.2 million and transport services US$417.1 million, illustrating the importance of services alongside merchandise trade. [3]
Georgia’s expanding computer and transport receipts create both complementary opportunities and competition for Armenian service exporters. Regional firms may combine Armenian production or expertise with Georgian logistics and market access. The gains depend on actual contracts and value added retained in Armenia; a high value of goods passing through Georgia is not automatically a large Georgian or Armenian domestic income gain. [34][38][48][54]
Geostat’s preliminary 2025 customs figures place Armenia fifth among Georgian export destinations: US$552.9 million, or 7.6 percent of exports, down 10.5 percent from 2024. Georgia recorded US$233.1 million of imports from Armenia and US$786.0 million of bilateral turnover. These Georgian-reporter flows include re-exports and differ conceptually from Armenian-origin production. Nationally, cars represented 38.6 percent of exports, while wine and ferro-alloy receipts fell; the trading platform and domestic manufacturing base therefore respond to different demand shocks. [159]
A same-quarter comparison sharpens the services story. Computer and information exports rose from US$222.6 million in the second quarter of 2025 to US$400.2 million a year later, while the current-account deficit narrowed from US$272.9 million to US$145.2 million. The third quarter of 2025 separately produced a US$338.8 million surplus alongside US$1.7 billion in travel exports. Digital receipts and the seasonal travel cycle thus contribute differently to external financing. Armenian service partnerships face both a growing neighbouring digital market and a tourism-linked demand cycle. [29][3][23]
The United Kingdom, Azerbaijan and Türkiye supplied 44.4 percent of adjusted 2025 FDI: US$426.6 million, US$214.4 million and US$202.4 million respectively. These are investment-source classifications in Geostat’s balance-of-payments statistics. They identify the recorded investor jurisdiction, which need not identify the ultimate beneficial owner or the nationality of every underlying investor. [160]
At 30 June 2026 Georgia’s gross external debt was US$28.2 billion, equivalent to 69.3 percent of the previous four quarters’ GDP. Government debt was US$9.1 billion and banking-sector debt US$10.8 billion. Foreign currencies accounted for 83.1 percent of the gross stock; net external debt was much lower, at US$12.2 billion. [2]
Currency mismatch is the mechanism connecting this balance sheet to the real economy. A Georgian borrower collecting lari revenue while servicing dollar debt needs more local revenue after depreciation, potentially reducing purchases from Armenian suppliers. The National Bank’s successive debt releases separate public, banking and other private liabilities; this matters because state borrowing, bank refinancing and intercompany obligations reach Armenian businesses through different counterparties. The 2020 pandemic discussion explicitly connected exchange-rate shocks, foreign inflows and debt-service pressure. [33][40][53][57][73]
The recent debt sequence shows why both the stock and denominator matter. Gross external debt was US$26.9 billion, 70.4 percent of GDP, at end-2025; US$27.1 billion, 68.7 percent, in March 2026; and US$28.2 billion, 69.3 percent, in June. The stock rose between December and March even as its GDP ratio fell. For Armenian counterparties this points to refinancing and currency exposure as concrete transmission channels, rather than interpreting a lower ratio as debt repayment or a larger stock as an immediate financing crisis. [16][9][2]
The May 2026 joint committee decision reported annual credit growth of 14.9 percent in March, excluding exchange-rate effects, with business lending leading expansion. It raised the threshold restricting unhedged foreign-currency loans from GEL750,000 to GEL1 million from July. Strong credit activity therefore coexisted with continued efforts to reduce currency mismatches. [15]
The financial-stability decisions and committee assessments document a policy designed to let lending expand while containing currency and capital risks. This has a concrete bilateral consequence: Georgian distributors may finance Armenian inventory through local banks, while Armenian service firms can encounter Georgian customers whose expansion depends on credit. A restriction on unhedged foreign-currency borrowing changes financing structure and eligibility, rather than prohibiting trade. A slowdown in credit can therefore reduce orders before it appears in merchandise statistics. [37][41][42][49]
Gross international reserves reached US$8.14 billion in August 2026, 56.4 percent above a year earlier. The National Bank reported adequacy at 128.2 percent of the IMF ARA benchmark. Monetary gold represented 14.1 percent of reserves, so valuation as well as foreign-exchange purchases contributed to changes in the headline reserve total. [5]
The larger reserve cushion improves Georgia’s capacity to absorb external liquidity shocks, but part of the change reflects gold valuation. For Armenia, the indirect benefit is a more resilient neighbouring payments and trade environment. The relevant vulnerability is a simultaneous deterioration in external receipts and financing conditions, particularly where Armenian firms depend on Georgian services or foreign-currency settlement. [31][116]
Earlier balance-of-payments releases reveal the continuing goods-services asymmetry. In the fourth quarter of 2016, travel-service exports were US$481.2 million and the current-account deficit was 17.5 percent of quarterly GDP; by the second quarter of 2026, computer services had become a large additional receipt. The comparison concerns different quarters and is not a seasonally adjusted growth calculation. It nevertheless shows why Georgia’s resilience now rests on a wider services base, while disruptions to mobility and international payments remain important transmission channels for Armenia. [141][143][3]
The 2026 reserve buildup was a sequence rather than a single valuation jump: approximately US$6.65 billion in February, US$7.0 billion in May, US$7.53 billion in July and US$8.14 billion in August. The bank also reported US$2.078 billion of net foreign-exchange purchases in January–June and an additional US$100 million gold purchase in June. This combination shows purchases as well as valuation changes. It improves the available liquidity cushion around bilateral payments, while leaving Georgian businesses exposed to the demand and pricing conditions of their individual markets. [19][14][6][5]
Geostat’s March 2026 release puts preliminary 2025 real GDP growth at 7.5 percent, following a revised 9.7 percent in 2024. Trade represented 14.8 percent of sectoral value added, information and communication 8.0 percent, and transport and storage 6.1 percent. ICT grew rapidly while agriculture contracted, so the expansion was uneven across activities. [154]
Geostat’s adjusted release of 17 August 2026 puts 2025 FDI at US$1,900.4 million, up 19.3 percent on its revised 2024 figure of US$1,592.7 million. Reinvested earnings supplied 82.5 percent. Finance and insurance received US$633.2 million, or 33.3 percent; this measures investment flows, rather than newly built factories or jobs. [160]
The World Bank’s 2022 firm and skills studies identify a gap between aggregate growth and creation of productive jobs, including difficulties scaling young firms and matching education to employer needs. These are structural findings from an earlier evidence base, not 2026 labour-market measurements. For Armenia, the useful opportunities are joint skills development, supplier integration and complementary services rather than simple competition over tax rates. [157][158]
The same release records 2025 equity investment of US$685.7 million, reinvested earnings of US$1,567.5 million and debt instruments of minus US$352.9 million. Negative debt flows partly offset the other components. It also revises earlier years, so comparisons must use a common release vintage rather than combining the former 2024 estimate with the new 2025 total. [160]
The annual unemployment rate stayed at 13.9 percent in 2025, but employment declined from 1,402.5 thousand to 1,389.7 thousand and the labour force from 1,629.5 thousand to 1,613.7 thousand. An unchanged unemployment rate therefore does not establish job growth: it describes the unemployed share of a smaller labour force. [161]
The World Bank’s 2025 Public Finance Review finds that Georgia’s fiscal framework benefits from established public-finance institutions and fiscal rules, while state-owned enterprises remain a source of contingent risk. It also identifies ageing-related spending pressure, climate and disaster exposure, and scope to improve the quality and equity of taxation and public services. Fiscal strength therefore involves spending efficiency, not only headline debt. [156]
For Armenia, Georgian public investment matters because maintained roads, reliable electricity and functioning public services support shared commercial routes. Large capital allocations create lasting value only when operating and maintenance costs are funded. Fiscal pressure on a transport or energy enterprise can therefore affect Armenian connectivity even without a deterioration in Georgia’s headline sovereign-debt indicator. [156][157]
The fiscal connection is particularly strong for infrastructure enterprises. Debt-financed expansion can create useful capacity today while committing later budgets to debt service, maintenance or support to an enterprise. The Public Finance Review’s treatment of state-owned-enterprise risk and ageing links these claims on public money: social spending and transport upkeep compete within the same medium-term envelope. Armenia’s commercial benefit is greatest when Georgian investment remains financially maintainable after construction, because road and network reliability are recurring services rather than one-time purchases. [156]
Geostat reports 7.1 percent of the population below the national absolute poverty line in 2025, down from 9.4 percent in 2024 and 11.8 percent in 2023. This is a household-survey living-conditions measure. It is neither the World Bank’s international dollar poverty line nor the number of people registered for targeted social assistance. [162]
An external energy-price shock can raise Georgian transport and supplier costs paid by Armenian firms while tighter credit reduces their customers’ demand. [1][15]
Rapid service-led growth can coexist with weak firm productivity and limited creation of better jobs, narrowing the industrial spillovers available to Armenia. [157][158][154]
Armenian producers can combine domestic production with Georgian distribution, transport and digital services in a market already recording substantial bilateral goods trade. [159][154][3]
Joint vocational and supplier programmes can connect Armenian capabilities with Georgian firms seeking skilled labour and scalable production. [157][158]
These scenarios explore how documented drivers could affect Armenia. They are conditional analytical paths, not predictions or assigned probabilities.
If Georgian service exports and domestic demand remain strong and bilateral firms build durable supplier relationships, Armenian manufacturers and specialists could gain orders through Georgian logistics and market access. The mechanism requires contracts and retained Armenian value added; growth in Georgia alone does not ensure the result. [154][3][159]
If external receipts weaken while fuel and financing remain costly, Georgian customers could cut orders and distributors could hold less Armenian inventory. Reserves and prudential buffers could soften financial stress, but would not replace the missing commercial demand. [1][5][15][3]
Watch whether inflation changes are persistent, whether external-account improvement survives seasonal shifts, and whether reserve growth is accompanied by manageable financing obligations. For Armenian users, connect those developments to actual customer demand, payment terms and currency exposure instead of inferring risk from one headline. [1][3][4][5][6]
These are analytical recommendations based on the evidence, not adopted government decisions or commitments by the named institutions. Timelines and measures below are proposed implementation tests.
Invite willing Armenian producers and Georgian distributors to select a small set of already marketable products.
Invite willing Armenian producers and Georgian distributors to select a small set of already marketable products. First obtain written purchase specifications, landed-cost quotations and payment terms, then organise a limited paid trial shipment with responsibility for returns and after-sales support assigned in advance.
Have exporters and their banks review major Georgian receivables by invoice currency, payment date and buyer revenue currency.
Have exporters and their banks review major Georgian receivables by invoice currency, payment date and buyer revenue currency. For the next contract renewal, compare a deposit, shorter staged payments and a priced currency clause; select terms jointly with the buyer rather than automatically extending unsecured credit.
Ask Armenian and Georgian service firms to define a paid client assignment before creating a training course.
Ask Armenian and Georgian service firms to define a paid client assignment before creating a training course. Attach a short joint placement to that assignment, document where staff work and who owns project outputs, and permit participants to decline relocation without losing training access.
Create an opt-in supplier-matching round around existing Georgian investors.
Create an opt-in supplier-matching round around existing Georgian investors. Begin with buyers’ technical requirements and recurring procurement needs, then arrange factory or service audits and a paid sample contract. Keep any proposed public support conditional on verified Armenian production or capability upgrading.
The count includes distinct documents whose content was retrieved and checked for relevance to this profile. Translations, duplicate links and generic homepages are excluded. A document may support more than one topic when its content is relevant to each. Historical documents retain their original dates; they do not establish that a project or policy remains unchanged today.
Filters use the source date recorded in this library. Indicator reference periods are shown separately.
Population below Georgia’s national absolute poverty line.
The national poverty definition is used throughout. This is distinct from international dollar poverty thresholds and social-assistance enrolment.
| Observation | Value · % of population | Reference period | Status | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | 11.8 | 2023 | Estimate | |
| 2024 | 9.4 | 2024 | Estimate | |
| 2025 | 7.1 | 2025 | Estimate |
A common 2025 WDI frame separates the composition of output, employment and expenditure. Reported national-account shares and ILO modeled employment shares answer different questions; they are shown separately.
On smaller screens, scroll the table sideways to compare all three countries.
| Indicator | 🇦🇲 Armenia | 🇦🇿 Azerbaijan | 🇬🇪 Georgia |
|---|---|---|---|
| Agriculture, forestry and fishing: value added% of GDPMatched period and definition | 7.9 % of GDP2025Reported resultSource | 5.9 % of GDP2025Reported resultSource | 5.2 % of GDP2025Reported resultSource |
| Industry, including construction: value added% of GDPMatched period and definition | 23.1 % of GDP2025Reported resultSource | 39.5 % of GDP2025Reported resultSource | 18.6 % of GDP2025Reported resultSource |
| Manufacturing: value added% of GDPMatched period and definition | 11.0 % of GDP2025Reported resultSource | 6.0 % of GDP2025Reported resultSource | 8.0 % of GDP2025Reported resultSource |
| Services: value added% of GDPMatched period and definition | 61.3 % of GDP2025Reported resultSource | 45.3 % of GDP2025Reported resultSource | 63.9 % of GDP2025Reported resultSource |
| Employment in agriculture% of total employmentRead with stated qualifications | 27.0 % of total employment2025EstimateSource 1Source 2 | 34.2 % of total employment2025EstimateSource 1Source 2 | 34.0 % of total employment2025EstimateSource 1Source 2Source 3 |
| Gross capital formation% of GDPMatched period and definition | 24.2 % of GDP2025Reported resultSource | 18.9 % of GDP2025Reported resultSource | 21.3 % of GDP2025Reported resultSource |
Sector value added as a share of GDP; a composition measure, not a sector growth rate. Same WDI indicator, common observation year and denominator across the three countries. National revisions remain possible.
Compare sector structure, not agricultural growth or the return from moving a worker. Armenia still needs product, land, water and buyer evidence for a specific intervention.
Includes mining, manufacturing, construction and utilities; manufacturing is a subset, not an additional sector to add. Same WDI indicator, common observation year and denominator across the three countries. National revisions remain possible.
Azerbaijan’s larger industry share cannot be read as an across-the-board manufacturing advantage; the aggregate includes mining, construction and utilities.
Manufacturing value added divided by GDP; excludes mining and is contained within the industry aggregate. Same WDI indicator, common observation year and denominator across the three countries. National revisions remain possible.
The narrower manufacturing measure helps Armenia distinguish processing capacity from a resource- or construction-heavy industry total; it does not measure competitiveness at a delivered price.
Services value added divided by GDP. Major sector shares need not sum to 100 because GDP includes taxes and other accounting adjustments. Same WDI indicator, common observation year and denominator across the three countries. National revisions remain possible.
Service-heavy output can support Armenian regional partnerships, but the aggregate cannot identify a buyer or separate tourism, finance, transport and digital work.
ILO modeled share of total employment in agriculture; it is not a national household-survey count or a measure of hours worked. Same WDI model series and year, but not interchangeable with national LFS. ILO may retain older definitions to avoid breaks; Georgia changed national standards in 2020. No complete country-specific reconciliation of the model-to-survey gaps is established here.
The common modeled series provides a structural comparator; Armenian regional training and service choices still require local demand and must not use a value-added-share/employment-share quotient as a wage ranking.
Includes fixed capital, inventories and valuables. It is broader than fixed investment and is not the FDI inflow or proof of investment efficiency. Same WDI indicator, common observation year and denominator across the three countries. National revisions remain possible.
A higher ratio is not proof of a more productive public project. Armenia should assess completion readiness, inventories, recurring costs and the service actually delivered.
The WDI vintage is 8 October 2026. Manufacturing is already included in industry; sector value-added shares need not sum to 100. The employment split is modeled and must not be substituted for a national labour-force survey. Dividing an output share by an employment share would not, without compatible prices, hours and coverage, establish a cross-country productivity or wage ranking.
All values are rounded to one decimal; original precision and indicator metadata are retained in the research notes. Source counts do not imply independent corroboration.
Several countries or indicators can share one underlying data release. Multiple source links do not mean independent confirmation.
These dated records preserve the earlier research edition. Later source releases and statistical revisions are reflected in the detailed analysis above.
Reference period: 2024; revised figure reproduced 20 March 2026
Geostat's March 2026 release lists revised 2024 real growth of 9.7% and nominal GDP of GEL 93.0 billion. The earlier 9.4% release was preliminary.
Reference period: 2024; adjusted release 15 August 2025
Geostat's adjusted series records US$1,569.3 million in 2024 FDI, down 18.6% from 2023. Reinvested earnings represented 85.8% of the total.
This is a curated starting collection, not an exhaustive country database or a live feed. Each record identifies its reference period and links to original evidence. “Announced” does not mean funded, ratified or operational; those distinctions are stated in the text. Armenia implications are editorial analysis, not source quotations. Census counts, population estimates and forecasts must not be treated as interchangeable. Source-check dates do not change the underlying data period.