"Hayk's Arrow" Armenian Strategic CenterMembershipCanada’s government review found credible evidence that WESCAM-equipped Bayraktar TB2 aircraft were used in Nagorno-Karabakh. This establishes use, without proving a complete aircraft inventory, who controlled every sortie or a verified total of losses inflicted.[216]
Baykar published the signing of an April 2023 goodwill protocol with Azerbaijan on joint UAV manufacturing. The announcement does not specify an aircraft quantity or establish that a production line entered operation.[150]
Azerbaijan’s presidency described AKINCI as recently integrated into service during the 9 February 2024 visit to Air Force facilities, the UAV Academy and hangars. The official account confirms receipt and training infrastructure, but publishes neither a fleet total nor a contract value.[149]
Bellingcat documented the September offensive and reviewed published aerial strike footage. The material reviewed here does not establish which UAV model carried out each attack; Azerbaijan’s possession of TB2 or AKINCI cannot by itself identify the aircraft used in this offensive.[151]
SIPRI identifies Israeli-supplied reconnaissance UAVs and loitering munitions alongside Turkish systems in Azerbaijan’s acquisition history. Azerbaijan also officially presented AZAD Systems’ Zarba UAVs in 2016. These records broaden the regional context without adding Israeli aircraft to the Turkish catalogue or establishing the joint venture’s founding date.[152][153]
The documented regional connection comprises wartime TB2 use, a later industrial-intent agreement and publicly acknowledged AKINCI infrastructure. These sources do not establish a current ready-to-fly fleet, every operator’s identity or the aircraft responsible for every strike. Those questions remain separate research gaps.[216][150][149][151]
A Turkish government-published journal retrospectively records TB2 use in northern Syrian operations, including Spring Shield in February–March 2020. A December 2020 British ministerial speech also discusses TB2 use in Syria and Libya. These are attributed assessments, not an independently verified damage tally or proof that every participating UAV was a TB2.[156][155]
The UN Panel’s March 2021 report describes TB2-supported operations in 2020 and refers to Kargu-2 and other loitering systems in engagements with retreating forces. It also lists a Kargu-2 transfer identified on 27 May 2020. The text does not establish an exact KARGU attack date, a casualty count for such an incident or a verified fatal engagement without human control.[154]
Ukraine’s National Defence University proceedings record the Ukrainian announcement of first Bayraktar combat use on 26 October 2021. The Navy’s own unit description also acknowledges TB2 reconnaissance and strike missions during the full-scale war. These institutional accounts establish use, without supplying a current fleet total or a complete assessment of effectiveness and losses.[157][158]
Human Rights Watch reported that the 7 January 2022 strike on displaced people in Dedebit killed at least 57 civilians and injured more than 42. Its researchers identified MAM-L remnants and discussed TB2 presence in Ethiopia. The munition evidence does not uniquely identify the launch aircraft; the casualty figure is HRW’s case-specific finding, not a total for all Turkish-drone strikes.[159]
HRW attributed three 2023 strikes to Burkinabè forces using TB2s and reported at least 60 civilian deaths: Bouro market on 3 August, a Bidi funeral on 21 September and a market near Boulkessi in Mali on 18 November. State media described the victims as Islamist fighters; HRW’s witness and visual investigation disputed that account. These are attributed findings, not a judicial verdict.[160]
HRW reported at least 14 civilian deaths, including four children, in drone strikes on a wedding on 16 February 2024 and a burial the next day. Its report also notes Mali’s acquisition of TB2s. The catalogue keeps that inventory context separate from definitive identification of the aircraft in each incident.[161]
HRW reported that an apparent Nigerien military drone strike on 6 January 2026 killed at least 17 civilians, including four children, and injured at least 13 at Kokoloko’s market. It explicitly could not identify the drone or munition. Reported Turkish-made aircraft in Niger’s inventory do not establish which type carried out this strike.[162]
The UN fact-finding mission assessed footage from 8 and 24 January 2026 as likely showing AKINCI use by the Sudanese Armed Forces. Its September report considered the systems foreign-supplied, while its investigation of transfer entities and states remained ongoing. It did not establish the complete intermediary chain or attribute every Sudanese drone strike to AKINCI.[163]
The same UN mission reported at least 13 civilians killed in the Yabus attack on 29 or 30 March 2026. Its component assessment for this attack was consistent with Yiha III, separate from its AKINCI findings. The Observatory therefore does not assign these deaths to TB2 or AKINCI, or add an unverified Turkish aircraft family on that basis.[163]
At its 9 May 2025 briefing, India said approximately 300–400 drones had been used at 36 locations during the preceding night and that preliminary reports suggested Turkish ASİSGUARD SONGAR drones; debris examination was ongoing. This is an Indian official claim, not independent confirmation that all the aircraft were SONGAR or a verified admission by the manufacturer.[164]
HRW’s December 2022 investigation reported civilian deaths and damage to essential services in Turkish strikes beginning on 20 November. Its findings concern the attacks and their humanitarian effects; they do not identify a particular Turkish UAV model in every episode. The record therefore makes no blanket attribution to TB2, ANKA, AKINCI or AKSUNGUR.[165]