"Hayk's Arrow" Armenian Strategic CenterMembershipBaykar · MALE armed UAV
Bayraktar TB2 is Baykar’s propeller-driven, medium-altitude long-endurance UAV family. The manufacturer describes reconnaissance, surveillance and armed applications, together with ground control and support systems. This profile follows a continuing industrial programme rather than one fixed configuration assumed to be identical for every customer.[3]
Polish and Romanian government records provide selected examples of export history. Poland separately documents its acquisition contract and completed deliveries; Romania’s selected record describes acceptance procedures beginning. These institutional milestones are more specific than a general customer-country count and remain attached to their original dates.[18][20]
Published manufacturer figures describe the stated configuration. They are not independently verified performance results; variants and operating conditions can differ.
Canada suspended relevant permits on 5 October 2020 and cancelled the suspended permits on 12 April 2021. Its final review found credible evidence of Canadian sensors on TB2s used in Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya and Syria. These decisions concern specified permits and end-use assurances; they are not a count of aircraft supplied or destroyed.[216][217][218]
On 29 January 2024 Canada ended presumptive denial for military exports to Türkiye. Applications remain subject to case-by-case risk assessment and additional end-use assurances. The notice establishes a licensing policy; it does not itself prove resumed WESCAM deliveries or a particular contract value.[219]
In October 2020 BRP told Radio Canada International that it had suspended engine deliveries to countries with unclear usage while investigating Rotax engines in military UAVs. This is a reported corporate response concerning civilian-origin engines, distinct from Canadian export-permit decisions. It does not establish that every TB2 subsequently changed engines.[220]
Baykar reported a TB2 firing test on 5 November 2020 using ASELSAN CATS designation and an inert MAM-L. ASELSAN’s June 2024 newsletter describes ASELFLIR-500 tests on TB2 and AKINCI. These announcements document Turkish sensor integration on named aircraft, not the sensor configuration of every export customer’s fleet.[224][225]
Baykar’s 2024 retrospective identifies MAM-L, MAM-C, BOZOK and KEMANKEŞ integration on TB2. TÜBİTAK SAGE explicitly names TB2 as a BOZOK platform; Roketsan supplies the MAM family. These programme-level statements do not establish the approved weapons fit of each operator. The documented 2020 CATS/MAM-L event was an inert-munition integration test.[229][228][224][231]
On 4 November 2026 Baykar reported a TB2 test carrying 16 Skydagger FPV drones, with two released in flight and striking designated targets. This is a manufacturer-reported test of a carrier role. It is not evidence of formal service acceptance, combat use or the exact catalogue model of each carried FPV drone.[230]
Baykar’s history distinguishes a tactical predecessor flying in 2009 from the named TB2’s first autonomous flight test and first delivery in 2014. The catalogue preserves year-only first-flight evidence rather than combining the predecessor and production programme or inventing an exact day.[27]
On 10 December 2024 Baykar reported one million cumulative flight hours and retrospectively placed Turkish service entry in 2014. Cumulative fleet hours are a dated company statement, not one aircraft’s endurance or an independently audited measure of present fleet size.[10]
The current page lists TB2-A, TB2-B, TB2-C and TB2-D. These are retained as manufacturer designations. Current family-page specifications should not be assumed to describe every historical export batch or all four variants without qualification; a flight record is also distinct from published endurance.[3]
Official records link a May 2021 four-system TB2 contract to the first handover in October 2022 and completion of contracted deliveries in May 2024. Systems, individual aircraft and support equipment remain separate units of description.[18][19]
The defence ministry documents an April 2023 contract for three TB2 systems and the start of first-system acceptance in June 2024. This selected record does not verify the programme’s subsequent acceptance or current operational state.[20]
| Country | Aircraft programmes | Documented stage / Evidence status | Published quantity / unit | Contract / agreement date | Notes & sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Albania | Bayraktar TB2 | Dated official delivery/service evidenceDocumented record | 3 aircraft recorded in June 2024 | The Albanian ministry states that three aircraft were already possessed and their first missions launched by June 2024; a merely prospective status is outdated.[171][172] | |
| Azerbaijan | Bayraktar TB2 | Dated official delivery/service evidenceDocumented record | Quantity not established by the selected evidence | Not established in selected sources | Canada’s government review finds credible evidence of WESCAM-equipped TB2 use by Azerbaijan in the 2020 conflict. It does not disclose a purchase quantity.[216] |
| Bangladesh | Bayraktar TB2 | Reported relationship; verification qualifiedReported; qualification retained | Quantity not established by the selected evidence | Not established in selected sources | Janes quoted the ISPR director that TB2 procurement was under process. A procurement discussion is retained separately from verified deliveries and current inventory.[195] |
| Burkina Faso | Bayraktar TB2Bayraktar AKINCI | Dated official delivery/service evidenceDocumented record | About 12 aircraft in a mixed handover; model split unpublished | Not established in selected sources | The presidency documents a mixed TB2/AKINCI handover on 8 April 2024. Its roughly dozen aircraft must not be treated as twelve of each model.[188] |
| Croatia | Bayraktar TB2 | Dated official delivery/service evidenceDocumented record | 6 aircraft in the contracted system | The 21 November 2024 contract covered six aircraft and support (€67.01 million excluding VAT). The ministry documents operational introduction on 2 September 2025.[168][169] | |
| Djibouti | Bayraktar TB2 | Reported relationship; verification qualifiedReported; qualification retained | 2 displayed aircraft; fleet total unknown | Not established in selected sources | Baykar republishes photographic reporting of two TB2 aircraft at the June 2022 parade. Two displayed aircraft are not a certified total fleet.[192] |
| Ethiopia | Bayraktar TB2 | Reported relationship; verification qualifiedReported; qualification retained | Quantity not established by the selected evidence | Not established in selected sources | Baykar republishes reporting linking its TB2 aircraft to Ethiopia. This selected record establishes an attributed relationship, not an audited aircraft total.[183] |
| Iraq | Bayraktar TB2 | Unresolved acquisition or attributionNot established in the selected evidence | Quantity not established by the selected evidence | Not established in selected sources | The defence minister publicly discussed agreement or interest in Bayraktar procurement in 2021. This evidence does not establish a completed TB2 delivery.[194] |
| Kenya | Bayraktar TB2 | Reported relationship; verification qualifiedReported; qualification retained | Quantity not established by the selected evidence | Not established in selected sources | TB2 training was publicly reported in August 2024; Baykar later named Kenyan deliveries in its 2024 account. No quantity is established here.[193][176] |
| Kosovo | Bayraktar TB2 | Reported relationship; verification qualifiedReported; qualification retained | Quantity not established by the selected evidence | Not established in selected sources | Reuters reported the prime minister’s July 2023 purchase announcement. The announcement did not disclose the number or cost; six is not adopted as a certified total.[170] |
| Kuwait | Bayraktar TB2 | Agreement announced; completion not establishedDocumented record | Quantity not established by the selected evidence | Baykar’s January 2023 statement announces a TB2 export contract but withholds aircraft numbers and delivery timing; monetary value is not an aircraft quantity.[173] | |
| Kyrgyzstan | Bayraktar TB2Bayraktar AKINCIAKSUNGUR | Reported relationship; verification qualifiedReported; qualification retained | Quantity not established by the selected evidence | Not established in selected sources | Reporting of the October 2023 presidential visit identifies acquired AKINCI and AKSUNGUR aircraft, alongside the earlier TB2 relationship; totals remain undisclosed.[177] |
| Libya | Bayraktar TB2 | Dated official delivery/service evidenceDocumented record | Quantity not established by the selected evidence | Not established in selected sources | The UN Libya panel documents TB2 presence and transfers in 2019. A transfer into the conflict must not be presented as a transparent government purchase contract.[181] |
| Maldives | Bayraktar TB2 | Dated official delivery/service evidenceDocumented record | Quantity not established by the selected evidence | Not established in selected sources | The presidency documents UAV service entry on 15 March 2024; Baykar’s launch account identifies TB2. Conflicting press quantities are not promoted to an official fleet total.[197][198] |
| Mali | Bayraktar TB2 | Reported relationship; verification qualifiedReported; qualification retained | Quantity not established by the selected evidence | Not established in selected sources | AFP’s report quotes Mali’s Air Force on receiving TB2 aircraft in January 2024. This is a dated delivery account, not a current fleet census.[186] |
| Morocco | Bayraktar TB2 | Reported relationship; verification qualifiedReported; qualification retained | 13 aircraft reported; not independently certified | Not established in selected sources | Infodefensa reports a 13-aircraft acquisition. This is an attributed order report, not a verified current fleet or a resolution of all competing totals.[179] |
| Niger | Bayraktar TB2 | Dated official delivery/service evidenceDocumented record | Quantity not established by the selected evidence | Not established in selected sources | Niger’s national news agency identifies Baykar as supplier of TB2 aircraft acquired by Niger. No complete order quantity is taken from this notice.[185] |
| Nigeria | Bayraktar TB2 | Reported relationship; verification qualifiedReported; qualification retained | Quantity not established by the selected evidence | Not established in selected sources | Military Africa reports Nigerian TB2 acquisitions. The register does not convert a broader Project Guardian package into 43 verified TB2 aircraft.[190] |
| Pakistan | Bayraktar TB2Bayraktar AKINCI | Reported relationship; verification qualifiedReported; qualification retained | Quantity not established by the selected evidence | Not established in selected sources | Crew training is documented by Baykar; secondary reporting traces both types to the January 2024 induction ceremony. No official fleet total is assigned.[174][175] |
| Poland | Bayraktar TB2 | Dated official delivery/service evidenceDocumented record | 4 systems / 24 aircraft | The defence ministry records completion of contracted deliveries on 16 May 2024. This is a delivered programme total, not a current airworthy fleet count.[18] | |
| Qatar | Bayraktar TB2 | Agreement announced; completion not establishedDocumented record | 6 aircraft; ground equipment additional | Not established in selected sources | The Turkish trade office describes six TB2 aircraft ready for delivery under the DIMDEX 2018 agreement; aircraft and ground equipment remain distinct.[167] |
| Romania | Bayraktar TB2 | Dated official delivery/service evidenceDocumented record | 3 systems, each with 6 aircraft / 18 aircraft contracted | The ministry records first-system acceptance beginning in June 2024 under an April 2023 contract; this notice does not certify later completion.[20] | |
| Rwanda | Bayraktar TB2 | Reported relationship; verification qualifiedReported; qualification retained | Quantity not established by the selected evidence | Not established in selected sources | Oryx lists a TB2 operator relationship; official contract details and quantities were not independently established in this review.[189] |
| Somalia | Bayraktar TB2 | Unresolved acquisition or attributionNot established in the selected evidence | Quantity not established by the selected evidence | Not established in selected sources | The UN Somalia panel discussed TB2 reporting and requested clarification. Presence, Turkish operation and a sovereign Somali purchase are different propositions; ownership is unresolved here.[196] |
| Sudan | Bayraktar TB2Bayraktar AKINCI | Documented imagery assessment; procurement terms unresolvedDocumented record | Quantity not established by the selected evidence | Not established in selected sources | CIR’s October 2026 original imagery assessment identifies TB2 and AKINCI with the Sudanese Armed Forces. It does not establish the alleged intermediary contract quantities.[208] |
| Togo | Bayraktar TB2 | Reported relationship; verification qualifiedReported; qualification retained | Quantity not established by the selected evidence | Not established in selected sources | Oryx lists a TB2 operator relationship; official contract details and quantities were not independently established in this review.[189] |
| Turkmenistan | Bayraktar TB2 | Dated official delivery/service evidenceDocumented record | Quantity not established by the selected evidence | Not established in selected sources | The defence ministry’s military publication identifies TB2 aircraft in the 27 September 2021 parade. Display evidence does not establish a contract quantity.[178] |
| Ukraine | Bayraktar TB2 | Dated official delivery/service evidenceDocumented record | Quantity not established by the selected evidence | Not established in selected sources | Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council documented an in-service TB2 demonstration on 20 March 2019. Later acquisitions and wartime losses are not aggregated here.[166] |
| United Arab Emirates | Bayraktar TB2 | Reported relationship; verification qualifiedReported; qualification retained | Quantity not established by the selected evidence | Not established in selected sources | Oryx lists the UAE as a TB2 operator. The proposed 60-aircraft figure is not independently verified in this register.[189] |
Baykar reports carrying 16 Skydagger drones and releasing two in a test; service acceptance and combat use are not established.[230]
Croatia’s defence ministry signs the six-aircraft system and support contract; deliveries and operational introduction are separate later stages.[168]
The Romanian ministry said quantitative and qualitative acceptance had begun that week. Its expected completion date was a forecast; the announcement does not establish completed acceptance or operational service.[20]
Poland’s ministry records the fourth system’s delivery and completion of deliveries under the May 2021 contract. This is fulfillment of the existing contract, not a new order.[18]
The Reuters interview describes an ongoing project and planned capacity; it is not a factory commissioning or production-start announcement.[209]
Presumptive denial ends; risk assessments and additional end-use assurances remain.[219]
A June 2024 defence ministry release places the contract in April 2023 and describes three systems with six aircraft per system. The source establishes month precision only.[20]
HRW later reported at least 57 civilian deaths and MAM-L remnants; the munition evidence does not conclusively identify the aircraft.[159]
The date is recorded in the National Defence University’s November 2021 proceedings as the Ukrainian account of first combat use in the Joint Forces Operation.[157]
Poland’s defence ministry identifies a contract for four TB2 systems signed with Baykar. A system is not the same counting unit as an aircraft.[18]
The final review and cancellation decision follow findings of credible evidence concerning Canadian technology in Nagorno-Karabakh.[218][216]
A government-published retrospective records TB2 use in the February–March Idlib campaign; the entry does not reproduce claimed destruction totals.[156]
The subsequent Canadian review found credible evidence of WESCAM-equipped TB2 use in Nagorno-Karabakh; the year marks use, not the review’s publication.[216]