Catalogue baseline reviewed 5 November 2026; supplementary research reviewed 6 November 2026. A documented statement does not independently verify every claim made by its author.
Documented records have a traceable institutional or original research source. Reported claims retain attribution and limitations. Unresolved details are not established by the selected evidence. These labels describe documentation, not independently proven operational effectiveness.
Scope: publicly documented military and security UAV families. Versions are grouped where they belong to the same programme; prototypes and historical models retain their documented status. Standalone missiles, payloads, crewed aircraft, and civilian-only products are outside this catalogue.
Newest aircraft uses the documented first-flight date. Latest developments uses the most recent dated milestone selected for each profile; it does not use the page review date.
Aircraft and systems are different units. Package prices are not unit aircraft prices. The page does not calculate a global fleet, export revenue or domestic-content percentage from these records. The source review date is not a claim that every programme’s latest status has been independently verified.
Catalogue coverage
Scope: publicly documented military and security UAV families. Versions are grouped where they belong to the same programme; prototypes and historical models retain their documented status. Standalone missiles, payloads, crewed aircraft, and civilian-only products are outside this catalogue.
ASELSAN
Includes publicly documented security programmes and SERÇE variants. Legacy programmes are labeled; current marketing/service status is not inferred.
All nine UAV/loitering families in the current eleven-entry product index are represented, plus the documented TB1 and Malazgirt heritage programmes. KEMANKEŞ 1/2 are excluded as officially classified mini cruise missiles; TB2 variants remain within their existing family.
Both air vehicles on CMC’s current aircraft page are covered. Current supplier attribution does not resolve the complete historical ownership of the SALGUR name. Naval and ground platforms are excluded.
All nine current aircraft listings are covered. FPV sizes are grouped under PEREGRINE; FALCON-DAD is retained as a FALCON variant. Civilian-only uses are not the basis for including logistics models.
GöKHUN and Mini UAS cover both complete UAVs in the current menu. MATRIS, GöRDES, avionics and crewed-aircraft conversion services are not additional UAV models.
JACKAL is the verified military-relevant family. The original Turkish demonstrator and later British combat configuration are distinguished; partner specifications are not back-applied to every prototype.
Both current surveillance-category aircraft are covered: Raven-SP9 and SUM8FD. The company explicitly serves police applications. Agricultural AGM models are excluded; NIGHTJAR is not in the current verified listing. Supplier attribution does not establish wholly indigenous airframe manufacture.
Own heritage and product records cover ARI, EFE, BORA and KARAYEL including Demo/S/U/SU. Corporate and partner records add KARGI. The public heritage origin was read over HTTP after TLS failures; unnamed camera or fuel-cell demonstrators are not invented as named families.
AZAB and AZAT are the distinct aircraft families verified in the product list. VURAL is explicitly based on AZAT and grouped there. NAZAAR is wearable/VR hardware; DROAD is a ground-vehicle solution with an unnamed drone, not another verified UAV family.
Seven separately listed FPV models, three fixed-wing names and one interceptor are covered. DART 81 and TOYCA 10 remain coming-soon announcements with deliberately blurred producer previews. Ammunition, batteries and fibre modules are excluded.
Air portfolio reconciled with 2026 releases. TURUL includes STM VTOL; payloads, NEST and KERKES are not counted as aircraft. STM officially acknowledges the TIRPAN development agreement, but that primary record does not define a separate airframe; it remains a documented programme rather than an additional aircraft entry.[94]
FEDAİ-101/102 are grouped from an archived official brochure and live company history. The current catalogue did not establish a current offering; no flight date is inferred.
All five current-index families are represented, plus official historical TURNA, GÖZCÜ and Pelikan references. ŞİMŞEK-K is retained as a family configuration. Some historical specifications remain unestablished; photographs and published illustrations retain their exact-model provenance.
Çağatay and Cengaver are covered as families. CGT50 has an organiser-hosted original brochure; the company’s July 2022 release confirms both families. The live producer domain fails, and old parent-company brochure URLs now return unrelated HTML. Current production and the full historical variant list remain unverified.
ZD100, ZD200, tactical ZK and the CBRN-capable ZCQM brochure configuration are covered. Possible ZCQM/ZD lineage remains unresolved; these are published programme designations, not a claim of four unrelated airframes. ZD300, VVC and ZCOM40 have logistics/general-purpose descriptions without verified military/security roles. The unavailable root navigation prevents a complete historical-portfolio claim.
This register preserves each investigator’s date, casualty minimum and attribution limits. Possession of a Turkish UAV, identification of a compatible munition and proof of a particular airframe’s participation are different evidence claims. The selected cases are not a comprehensive casualty census and must not be added together as a verified total of deaths caused by Turkish drones.[159][161][162][163]
Export reach is an attributed claim, not a buyer census
Documented record
Baykar cited agreements with 37 countries in February 2026 (36 for TB2; 16 for AKINCI); the May Safran–Baykar release cited 39 overall. These overlapping, dated claims cannot be added or treated as delivered fleets. Ranking and market-share language remains attributed to its publisher.[233][211]
Unconfirmed fleet and contract claims
Not established in the selected evidenceNot established by the reviewed sources
The reviewed material does not establish a complete KIZILELMA prototype/serial-aircraft census, a documented military handover, exact 2026 AKINCI delivery totals or a specific resumed WESCAM contract value. Production-model labels, future targets and export-policy changes are retained in their own evidence classes rather than converted into delivered inventory.[13][249][219]
Baykar-hosted press reprint containing the signatory’s statement; a goodwill protocol, not proof of a functioning production line. Event precision is April 2023.
Original witness, visual and satellite investigation of the 7 January 2022 Dedebit strike. MAM-L identification does not uniquely identify the launch aircraft.
Original investigation of February 2024 wedding and burial strikes. The text also notes TB2 acquisition; inventory context alone is not conclusive identification of each strike aircraft.
Ministry of External Affairs of India · Published:
Official preliminary identification, not independent confirmation. The published transcript body was verified through the same ministry’s FetchPublicationDetailData endpoint, pkid 39482, languageId 1.
National Defence University of Ukraine · Published:
Conference dated 26 November 2021; printed/PDF page 60 records the Ukrainian account of first combat use on 26 October 2021. This is a retrospective institutional publication.
Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB) · Publication date not stated
Official indexed report text was available; direct retrieval returned HTTP 403 during this review. Sector-wide data include services and are not drone-only totals.
Presidency of Türkiye, Directorate of Communications · Published:
Government-published journal, printed page 32 (PDF page 38), retrospective discussion of TB2 use in northern Syria. This is an attributed account, not independent battle-damage verification.
Secondary publication reporting figures attributed to SSB. SSBülten is not the government agency; an accessible primary statement confirming these exact 2026 values was not secured.
Ukrainian Navy Recruiting Centre · Publication date not stated
Undated unit description acknowledges TB2 reconnaissance and strike operations; reviewed 6 November 2026, without treating the review date as a combat milestone.
Advance unedited version; paragraphs 46–48 and 101–107 distinguish likely AKINCI use from Yiha III component evidence. Investigation of suppliers and intermediaries remained ongoing.
Paragraph 63, transfer table and annex 30. The report discusses 2020 operations and Kargu-2 transfers; it does not establish a first fatal fully autonomous attack.