Georgia

Geostat’s current population series reports approximately 3.930 million people at the start of 2025 and 3.941 million at the start of 2026. Its notes explicitly state that population and related measures from January 2025 were recalculated using the 2024 census. Earlier published estimates therefore belong to a different statistical vintage and cannot be joined without adjustment. [29][30][31][32][33]

For Armenia, the practical baseline is the population actually covered by the Georgian statistical system, with the treatment of occupied territories retained in comparisons. Revised totals improve planning for markets and services but do not demonstrate sudden economic expansion. Border-region analysis should use the municipal tables, since national growth can coexist with very different local trajectories. [12][13][19][20][27][30][31]

The final census, released in June 2026, supplies a cleaner long-run comparison than mixing annual estimate vintages. Between the 2014 and 2024 censuses, the total rose 5.8 percent, while urban population grew 15.7 percent and rural population fell 7.4 percent. Samtskhe-Javakheti declined from 160,504 to 155,282 residents, or 3.3 percent; Kvemo Kartli grew 4.2 percent. The Armenian ethnic total increased only 0.7 percent and its population share fell to 4.3 percent. National recovery, urban concentration and slower growth of a minority population thus coexist in the same comparable census evidence. [144][15]

Recorded live births fell from 39,483 in 2024 to 37,867 in 2025. The published total fertility rate fell from 1.67 to 1.53 over the same years. Mean age at childbirth reached 30.1 years in 2025, and 27.4 for first births. Together these indicators describe fewer births and later family formation, rather than a single short-term anomaly. [52][53][54][55][56][57][58]

The Armenian relevance is comparative policy learning: childcare, employment conditions and housing affect when households can form families, but these tables alone cannot identify the causal effect of a particular subsidy. Marriage and birth-order series add useful context. Differences between the two countries should be tested against age structure and migration rather than explained by a single cultural assumption. [37][38][40][49][54][58]

In 2025, infant mortality was 7.6 deaths per 1,000 live births, compared with 7.4 in 2024; under-five mortality remained 9.1 per 1,000. These are distinct child-survival indicators, not percentages or the all-age death rate. Geostat identifies the series from 2014 onward as based on registered vital events. [2][103]

Georgia registered 44,319 deaths in 2025, exceeding births by 6,452. Life expectancy at birth was 76.0 years overall, 71.4 for males and 80.6 for females. In the rebased population series, people aged 65 and over accounted for about 18.1 percent at the start of 2026. These figures connect natural decrease with substantial ageing and a marked sex gap in longevity. [35][66][67][68][69][70][71]

For Armenia, the policy connection is the future balance between workers, carers and people requiring support. Older populations can alter healthcare and transport needs in neighbouring districts and the structure of cross-border services. Age-specific mortality and dependency ratios are more informative than deaths alone, because a rising total may partly reflect the changing age composition. [32][50][60][62][65][68]

Using the same rebased 1 January 2026 single-year table, summing ages 15–64 gives 2,478,333 residents, or about 62.9 percent of the total, while ages 65 and over give 712,511, or 18.1 percent. The published old-age dependency ratio is 28.7 people aged 65+ per 100 aged 15–64, with total age dependency 59.0. This is a harmonised demographic denominator, not the number of employed taxpayers: education, inactivity and unemployment reduce employment within working age, while some older residents continue working. [32][33][35][136][25][26]

The median age was 38.0 years at the start of 2026: 36.0 for men and 40.0 for women. This is the age dividing residents into two equal-sized groups, not life expectancy. Geostat rebased the series from 2025 using the 2024 census, so the apparent change across that break is not a pure ageing trend. [83]

Geostat records 131,501 immigrants and 114,374 emigrants in 2025, implying net migration of 17,127. This positive balance exceeded the year’s natural decrease. The table also separates age and sex, while other files distinguish citizenship and country of birth. A migration flow, a foreign-citizen population and an ethnic community are different statistical objects. [15][16][17][61][62][77][91]

For Armenia, these distinctions matter when assessing mobility, diaspora links and competition for skilled workers. Citizenship does not identify language or ethnicity, and an arrival does not necessarily mean permanent settlement. Municipal and age profiles can reveal where labour and service demand is changing, while the reasons-for-migration tables help avoid treating all movement as economically identical. [15][16][61][89][90][91][92][107]

The labour-force survey reports that 17.6 percent of people aged 15–24 were outside employment, education or training in 2025, compared with 28.5 percent in 2020. The corresponding 15–29 measure was 23.4 percent in 2025. The difference demonstrates why changing the age band changes the policy picture even when both measures are called NEET. [23][24][27][28][34][94]

Armenia can use these data to compare the transition from education to work and identify scope for joint training or professional mobility. A better youth headline does not eliminate long-term unemployment or inactivity. Education, occupation and labour-underutilisation tables are needed to distinguish shortages of qualified people from a mismatch between available skills and actual employment opportunities. [23][24][27][28][51][94][105]

The census tables disaggregate households by size, housing type, floor space and facilities, while population tables provide municipal and urban–rural detail. Separate disability tables record different levels and types of health-related limitation. These are substantive dimensions of living conditions: a national population total cannot show who can access housing, transport, work or services in a particular locality. [7][8][9][10][11][13][14]

For Armenia, regional detail matters most where communities and transport routes meet across the border. An ageing rural district and a growing urban labour market can require different partnerships even inside the same country. Inclusive transport, accessible services and skills initiatives should therefore follow local population structure rather than a uniform national template or assumptions about a named ethnic group. [13][14][19][20][27][29]

The 2024 census counted 1,198,602 private households, including 214,632 one-person and 274,319 two-person households. Together, these smaller households represented 40.8 percent of the total, calculated from the published counts. The unit is a private household: these figures do not count dwellings, biological families or people living in collective institutions. [8]

The 2024 census table records 169,296 residents identifying as Armenian by nationality or ethnicity, within the census population of 3,929,581. Of these, 154,469 reported Georgian citizenship; a different column records only 5,381 residents whose main citizenship was Armenian, including 5,045 identifying ethnically as Armenian. The distinction is substantive: the established Armenian community is primarily a community of Georgian citizens. It cannot be measured by the number of Armenian passports or by recent arrivals from Armenia. [15][16][17]

The rebased municipal series places Samtskhe-Javakheti at 155,480 residents at the start of 2026, including 45,238 in Akhalkalaki municipality and 23,568 in Ninotsminda municipality; Kvemo Kartli had 440,058 residents. These are total municipal and regional populations, not ethnic counts. The sharp changes between the earlier 2024 estimates and rebased 2025 values are partly statistical revision. For Armenian regional planning, the municipal scale is important because schools, care services and transport links serve actual settlements rather than a national diaspora total. [29][30][31]

The census offers a route to practical cooperation without reducing communities to ethnicity. Municipal education, employment and health-limitation tables can identify whether residents need language support, accessible transport or routes into better-paid work. An Armenian institution supporting training in a Georgian border municipality would work with a locally resident population subject to Georgian institutions. Its likely benefit comes through employability and access to services, not through treating every Armenian citizen in Georgia as a minority resident or every ethnic Armenian as a migrant. [12][13][19][20][27]

The 2025 population accounting is internally coherent: net migration of 17,127, less natural decrease of 6,452, equals the increase of 10,675 between the rebased start-of-2025 and start-of-2026 totals. This arithmetic shows how migration can temporarily offset fewer births than deaths. It does not imply a return to high fertility or reverse ageing automatically: the effect on workforce size depends on the age distribution of arrivals and departures, which Geostat publishes separately. [29][32][52][61][62][67]

The census stock of immigrants has a wider time horizon than one year’s border movement. Its reasons-for-migration table lists 259,120 immigrants, with family reunification or formation accounting for 108,229 and housing for 59,313; education accounted for 37,849 and employment for 16,314. These categories explain why an immigration total cannot be read simply as labour recruitment. Tbilisi contained 128,503 of this immigrant stock, making urban housing, universities and family networks important alongside jobs. The figures describe the November 2024 census population, not 2025 arrivals. [107][17]

Ageing and migration meet inside households. A working-age adult who moves can increase money income while reducing available unpaid care; an older relative remaining in a small settlement may then depend more on transport and formal services. Georgia’s household-size, dwelling-facility and disability tables support analysis of this mechanism, though they do not by themselves establish that a particular household receives remittances. For Armenia, cross-border training, accessible transport and coordinated referral services would address shared needs more directly than a competition to maximise national population totals. [7][8][9][10][14][43][63][64]

These scenarios explore how documented drivers could affect Armenia. They are conditional analytical paths, not predictions or assigned probabilities.

Key indicators are births and first-birth timing, the 65+ population share, age-specific migration, youth transitions into work, and municipal population changes. Preserve the census vintage and occupied-territory exclusions in each comparison. A short-lived migration gain should not obscure natural decrease or be interpreted as durable labour-force growth without age and residence evidence. [29][30][31][32][33][34][35]