"Hayk's Arrow" Armenian Strategic Center
Armenia’s latest retrieved resident estimate reached 3.104 million in July 2026, while age structure, migration and regional concentration create distinct policy pressures.
Armenia’s latest retrieved resident estimate reached 3.104 million in July 2026, while age structure, migration and regional concentration create distinct policy pressures. The evidence links population accounting with household security, integration and human capital rather than treating a single total as a measure of national resilience.
The detail below uses WDI/UN demographic estimates and ILO modeled labour series, not national census counts or a merged population total. Common-year comparisons preserve the distinction between labour-force participation, employment and age composition.
| Indicator | Value and reference period |
|---|---|
| Female labour-force participation, age 15+ILO modeled female labour force—employed plus unemployed—divided by female population aged 15+. Participation is not employment. | 51.1 % of female population aged 15+2025Estimate[203][212] |
| Male labour-force participation, age 15+ILO modeled male labour force—employed plus unemployed—divided by male population aged 15+; the same age threshold as the female series. | 69.5 % of male population aged 15+2025Estimate[204][212] |
| Female employment-to-population ratio, age 15+ILO modeled employed women divided by all women aged 15+; excludes unemployed jobseekers from the numerator. | 44.0 % of female population aged 15+2025Estimate[205][212] |
| Male employment-to-population ratio, age 15+ILO modeled employed men divided by all men aged 15+; it is not the employment share of the working-age 15–64 population. | 61.1 % of male population aged 15+2025Estimate[206][212] |
| Urban population shareUN-smoothed population series using each country’s national urban definition; urban boundaries and classifications are not identical. | 65.9 % of total population2025Estimate[207] |
| Total age dependency ratioPopulation under 15 plus population 65+, divided by population 15–64. Age groups do not identify actual earners, carers or financial dependence. | 50.2 persons per 100 people aged 15–642025Estimate[208] |
| Older-age dependency ratioPopulation aged 65+ per 100 people aged 15–64, using the WDI/UN population series; not a pensioner-to-worker ratio. | 21.7 persons per 100 people aged 15–642025Estimate[209] |
| Child-age dependency ratioPopulation under 15 per 100 people aged 15–64. It describes age composition, not the cost or quality of childcare and schooling. | 28.5 persons per 100 people aged 15–642025Estimate[210] |
| Life expectancy at birthPeriod life expectancy: expected years if that year’s mortality patterns persisted; not the observed lifetime of a birth cohort. | 78.3 years2024Estimate[211] |
Armenia’s modeled female participation is 51.1% against 69.5% for men in 2025, an 18.5-percentage-point gap calculated from the same-age series. The corresponding employment ratios are lower because participation includes unemployed jobseekers. This identifies room to investigate barriers to paid work, but does not prove that childcare explains the whole difference or that every non-participant wants a job. Armenian employment and care programmes should test voluntary demand, schedules, skills and local vacancies before assigning a remedy; a national modeled average is not a household assessment. [203][204][205][206]
The dependency ratios separate children from older residents rather than combine all non-working ages into one policy target. For Armenia, the mix matters to schools, primary care, transport and caregivers, but the denominator counts everyone aged 15–64, including people outside employment. Urbanisation and longevity add planning context without specifying service capacity or the geography of unmet need. These international estimates should therefore sit alongside Armstat’s separately dated permanent-population and census series. They must not be used to revise a local allocation mechanically or to promise a particular fertility, migration or workforce outcome. [209][210][208][207][211]
Labour rows are ILO modeled estimates for age 15+, whereas age-dependency ratios use ages 15–64 as the denominator. UN population estimates and national census-rebased series may differ; they must not be spliced. Urban definitions remain national. Life expectancy uses the common 2024 observation, while the other rows use 2025; it is not a forecast of an individual’s lifespan. ILO models combine reported and imputed observations and may retain an older employment definition where changing standards would create a break. The exact model-to-survey reconciliation has not been established here; treat labour comparisons as qualified, not a ranking of national labour-market performance. [203][208][207][211][212]
The most immediate demographic decision is whether public assistance enables a workable daily life at the location a household freely chooses.
The most immediate demographic decision is whether public assistance enables a workable daily life at the location a household freely chooses. Housing, work, care and transport are separate services but form one household budget and timetable. A residential allocation made without those interfaces can leave qualified adults unable to work and children or older relatives far from support. The housing project's implementation and stakeholder documents, together with the migration evidence, justify examining this chain; they do not prove that a specific proposed service package will retain residents. The strategic objective is durable welfare and participation, rather than a promised increase in births or a restriction on future movement. [7][30][35][17][69]
Start with a short voluntary access assessment because a housing choice can shape later commuting, care and employment costs for years. Improving information and referrals before that choice is less irreversible than correcting an unsuitable placement afterwards. Keep the assessment proportionate: assistance must continue while unresolved needs are referred, without another eligibility test or compulsory relocation. [7][35][30]
Proposed horizons run from authorisation. Later stages depend on the conditions below; these are analytical choices, not adopted deadlines or funding commitments.
In the proposed first 90 days, agree a minimal service-access checklist with existing social services and willing households. Verify actual opening hours, transport and referral capacity for the relevant locations; offer alternatives in plain language. Record only information needed for assistance and establish how users can correct a mistaken referral. [35][47][7]
At 3–12 months, use observed service gaps to choose between adjusted childcare hours and professionally assessed outreach for older residents. Fund staff and continuity before increasing places. Compare voluntary use, access to paid work, care quality and unmet need against a baseline; do not use short-run births as the success test. [69][73][9][91]
Beyond 12 months, expand the interventions with reliable service outcomes and affordable staffing. Add qualification-to-paid-work bridges where employers demonstrate vacancies, preserving licensing and normal employment protections. Reassess geography when demand changes; ongoing participation remains voluntary and basic support does not depend on accepting a particular job, care arrangement or residence. [17][11][69]
The scarce input is often recurring service capacity, not a building: trained carers, primary-care time, safe hours and a funded route between institutions. Capital assistance cannot by itself provide these. Municipalities should state which operating obligations they can carry before expanding provision. A common needs-based route also reduces resentment when newcomers and existing residents face similar gaps; access must not be allocated by ancestry or political loyalty. [73][75][35][69]
Where professional assessment identifies an acute care gap threatening health or independent living, primary-care outreach should precede a housing-service redesign. That is a needs-based exception, not an age quota. Conversely, a municipality with adequate care but documented incompatible childcare hours may start there. The proposed ranking should follow the severity and reversibility of unmet needs, using local evidence instead of a nationwide demographic target. [73][9][69]
A larger older population affects Armenia through care time as well as pensions. The internationally comparable age series shows why a rising total population can coexist with pressure on the working-age share. If families fill service gaps with unpaid care, some working-age adults reduce paid employment, amplifying the initial demographic burden. Older people also differ greatly in health, income and ability to contribute; age alone is a poor allocation rule. The policy implication is to support functional independence and accessible primary care while enabling caregivers to remain economically active. This can improve effective labour supply without changing retirement definitions or treating older residents as a homogeneous dependency group. [198][199][73][69]
The demographic strategy’s focus on human capital and individual choice provides a more useful policy basis than promises to engineer a particular birth total. Fertility is influenced by a combination of income security, care arrangements, health and expectations; a single payment cannot be assumed to change those conditions durably. For Armenia, childcare reliability and decent work matter to people who already have children as well as those considering parenthood. Improving these services has welfare value even if fertility does not increase. Evaluation should therefore recognise family choice, child well-being and parents’ ability to combine responsibilities, rather than judging every intervention solely by subsequent births. [69][200][91][64]
New residents add skills, demand and social connections, but those gains are conditional on the ability to establish a workable life. The migration survey’s gap between educational attainment and employment illustrates why counting qualifications is insufficient. Housing far from employment, weak transport, delayed recognition of credentials or missing childcare can turn an initial settlement into continued insecurity. Armenia’s housing and social-service programmes therefore interact with labour policy. The implication is to evaluate durable residence through voluntary access to work and services, not through restrictions on movement or pressure to accept an unsuitable location. Successful integration should also improve local capacity for existing residents, reducing competition over scarce services. [17][30][7][35]
Yerevan’s concentration and the continuing rural population create different service problems. Dense neighbourhoods can face crowding and high housing costs, while small settlements may struggle to sustain specialised staff or frequent transport. Equal treatment therefore does not require identical facilities everywhere; it requires a realistic route to comparable essential services. Armenia can combine local provision, outreach and transport where appropriate, but closing a local service before an alternative works can deepen outmigration. The relevant demographic choice is how to preserve viable lives across regions while adapting to changing demand, rather than maintaining every inherited institution unchanged or directing residents to move against their preferences. [14][51][90][73]
Armstat’s bulletin records 3,103,900 permanent residents on 1 July 2026, compared with 3,096,900 on 1 January 2026. These are current-account estimates built on the 2022 census, not new enumerations. The difference of 7,000 is a half-year change and should not be presented as an annual growth rate. [14][16]
The 2025 demographic handbook gives 3,076,200 residents at the beginning of 2025 and explains how births, deaths and migration update the census base. The series therefore measures several processes together. A rising total does not, by itself, show that fertility increased or that emigration ceased. [51][50]
For Armenia, the strategic issue is the composition and durability of population change. Quarterly bulletins and older handbooks establish a traceable record, while census-based revisions prevent a mechanical continuation of outdated estimates. Comparisons with neighbouring countries must retain their different observation dates, geographic coverage and resident-population definitions. [81][48][49]
The 2022 census combined population and border-management registers with household interviews at a 25% sample of addresses. That share describes sampled addresses, not 25% of residents or a full household enumeration. [201][202]
In July 2026, Armstat counted 1,149,500 residents in Yerevan. Urban residents numbered 1,983,600 and rural residents 1,120,300 nationally. These figures place more than one-third of the permanent population in the capital, while a substantial rural population still depends on dispersed local services and transport connections. [14][15]
Regional population tables and the Social Investment and Local Development project documents address complementary sides of this geography. The former locate residents; the latter describe individual investments such as kindergartens and water systems. Their existence documents local needs and planned responses, without proving that every facility now offers adequate services. [91][90][52]
Analysis: concentration can improve access to larger labour markets, education and specialist care while increasing capital-city housing pressure. Regional resilience depends on whether smaller settlements offer viable employment and essential services. Population retention is therefore linked to economic opportunity and access, not merely administrative boundaries or construction spending. [93][95]
The 2025 handbook separates urban and rural age structures: people aged 63 and above represented 21.9% of urban residents and 16.6% of rural residents at the start of 2025. Its threshold is 63, so these percentages are not interchangeable with international indicators for the population aged 65 and over. [51][87]
The government adopted the Demographic Strategy 2024–2040 on 17 October 2024. UNFPA describes its focus on human capital, family well-being and healthy ageing. That approach recognises that longer lives and lower fertility change demand for care, employment arrangements and household support, even when the total resident count increases. [69][96]
Analysis: the policy trade-off concerns the quality and affordability of family life as well as population numbers. Childcare, housing, reproductive health and employment interact. Older population shares also imply sustained care needs; these should be assessed alongside healthy-life outcomes and the capacity of working-age households to provide unpaid support. [177][103]
The provisional January–August 2026 register records 19,865 live births and 16,391 deaths, producing a natural increase of 3,474. Births fell while natural increase rose because deaths also declined. These are eight-month totals. [18]
Armstat’s Migration Snapshot for 2024, published in 2026, uses weighted household-survey results covering movements during 2022–2024. It identifies 296,600 household members involved in migration movements, including 89,400 who left and had not returned, 46,600 returnees and 160,600 new arrivals. These are survey categories, not annual border-crossing totals. [17]
The same survey identifies 66,200 internal movers, or 22.3% of the migrant household members. Foreign-born residents formed 8.5% of the surveyed permanent population; within that group, 52.1% were born in Karabakh. These definitions connect recent displacement with longer migration histories and do not classify every foreign-born person as a recent refugee. [17][53]
Analysis: Armenia faces both outward labour mobility and the integration of newcomers. Skills recognition, stable housing and schooling influence whether arrival becomes durable settlement. The movement of families inside Armenia also affects regional labour supply and service demand, so national net migration alone cannot describe the distribution of pressures and opportunities. [82][47][85]
Migration changes the composition of households as well as their number. The 2024 survey’s categories distinguish returnees, people still away and new arrivals, so they describe different demands on housing and employment services. The housing project documents the shift from emergency support toward targeted assistance and longer-term access to homes. The September 2026 UNHCR meeting likewise frames the issue as long-term integration of displaced Karabakh Armenians. This matters for Armenia’s population outlook because legal residence, a stable livelihood and service access make staying feasible. A migration inflow can expand skills and demand, while unsuccessful labour-market integration can produce dependence or onward movement. The relevant causal link is therefore between settlement conditions and the durability of the population gain. [17][30][7][5][33][35]
The 2025 population-account migration component includes displaced Karabakh Armenians registered in the State Population Register. It therefore cannot be read as a count of people crossing into Armenia during 2025. [26]
The 2024 migration survey reports that foreign-born residents had a 5.8 percentage-point advantage in higher educational attainment, but Armenian-born residents had a 14.8-point advantage in employment. The contrast shows why credentials and actual labour-market access must be considered separately; educational attainment alone does not demonstrate successful economic integration. [17][162]
The Education Improvement project and its 2022 additional financing address the supply of educational opportunities, while social-protection administration reforms address the organisation of assistance and employment services. Completion reviews and implementation reports form different evidence stages: financing or a facility can exist before access, quality and employment outcomes improve. [89][47][98][86][100]
Analysis: demographic resilience depends on converting existing skills into productive, secure work. For newcomers and returning migrants, language, credential recognition, care responsibilities and local vacancies may matter differently. Regional education and social-service investments are therefore relevant to demography when they change participation and retention, rather than merely adding buildings or programme enrolments. [10][29][90][91]
The April 2026 Human Capital Country Brief broadens the discussion from schooling alone to health, tertiary education and work experience. It places Armenia’s HCI+ at 224 on a maximum scale of 325, below the regional comparison of 240. That is a composite prospective index, not a wage forecast or an observed productivity percentage. Its relevance is the chain from learning to employment: education investments lose part of their value when graduates cannot use their skills, while ill health limits working lives. The migration survey’s gap between educational attainment and employment among foreign-born residents reinforces this point. Credential recognition, language and information access, employer matching and care responsibilities are mechanisms through which integration and labour participation can improve the effective workforce without changing its age definition. [11][17][89][67]
Armenia’s demographic record combines a growing recent resident estimate with age-structure pressures and substantial displacement-related settlement. These developments can coexist. Household security requires housing, income and accessible services; demographic policy cannot be evaluated solely through a population target detached from the conditions under which people live and form families. [14][69][96]
The Housing Response and Mortgage Market Enhancement project was approved in December 2025 to improve refugees’ access to housing solutions. Separately, the June 2026 health-coverage implementation report sets objectives for primary-care quality, spending efficiency and lower financial barriers. These programmes connect demographic resilience to housing stability and the affordability of essential services. [7][9]
Analysis: the strongest demographic strategy aligns regional development, family support and integration with the state’s fiscal and administrative capacity. Armenia gains resilience when residents can plan education, work and care without repeated disruption. Progress should be judged through those lived conditions as well as transparent population, fertility, mortality and migration statistics. [130][47][85][17][53]
The World Bank’s directly retrieved international series puts Armenia’s population aged 65 and over at 14.44% in 2025, up from 12.34% in 2020. The common 15–64 age group accounts for 66.57% in 2025, compared with 67.06% in 2024. These age bands support comparison with other countries; they are not a count of employed people or a legal definition of pension eligibility. The shift matters because fewer working-age people relative to older residents can raise the financing and care burden even when the total population grows. Fertility in the same database is 1.7 births per woman for 2024, after 1.9 in 2023. It describes the period’s age-specific fertility schedule, not completed family size. Neither migration-led population growth nor a temporary fertility increase removes ageing immediately: new births take years to enter employment, while many older residents need services now. Armenia’s practical response therefore has to combine healthy ageing, stronger labour participation, family support and integration of newcomers. [198][199][200][69]
Family decisions depend on the reliability of everyday institutions. The demographic strategy’s focus on quality of life connects children’s care, women’s opportunities and older people’s security rather than treating a birth target as a complete policy. Kindergarten investments in Horom, Panik and Vanadzor illustrate the local infrastructure through which care can become easier to combine with paid work; their project documents establish the planned interventions, not a national coverage rate. Education programme reports add the quality and equity dimension, while school mental-health support addresses needs that physical buildings cannot solve. The primary-healthcare assessment and universal-coverage programme similarly connect ageing and family security to affordable treatment. These services influence whether households can maintain employment and whether families see a viable future in their community. Housing support for displaced households adds another essential layer, but location matters: a home far from work, transport or school may not produce durable integration. [69][91][93][95][10][44][64][1][73][75][30]
Ageing and low fertility can increase care and pension demands faster than the effective workforce grows. [198][199][200]
Housing without suitable work, schools and services can leave displaced households insecure and encourage further movement. [30][17]
Better childcare, primary healthcare and employment access can expand labour participation and improve family security. [69][73][91]
Successful integration can convert newcomers’ education and experience into durable Armenian human capital. [17][11][30]
These scenarios explore how documented drivers could affect Armenia. They are conditional analytical paths, not predictions or assigned probabilities.
If housing support connects families with jobs and services, recent arrivals can strengthen the resident workforce and local demand. This is not a population forecast. [30][17][69]
If fertility remains low and integration and labour participation disappoint, ageing raises pressure on working households and public services despite a larger headline population. This is not a forecast. [198][199][200][17]
These are analytical recommendations based on the evidence, not adopted government decisions or commitments by the named institutions. Timelines and measures below are proposed implementation tests.
Add a voluntary service-access assessment to existing housing assistance.
Add a voluntary service-access assessment to existing housing assistance. Before households choose, provide clear information on nearby work, schools, healthcare, transport and expected housing costs. Assign a case contact through existing social services and offer referrals after moving. Use transparent need-based criteria and give households meaningful alternatives rather than directing settlement.
In willing municipalities, use existing kindergartens to test extended or adjusted hours where a voluntary parent survey and employer schedules show unmet demand.
In willing municipalities, use existing kindergartens to test extended or adjusted hours where a voluntary parent survey and employer schedules show unmet demand. Fund staffing, safeguarding and access before adding places. Include families with irregular work and carers seeking employment, and avoid promising any particular fertility response.
Use existing primary-care teams to pilot coordinated follow-up for older residents with unmet care needs, based on professional assessment and consent.
Use existing primary-care teams to pilot coordinated follow-up for older residents with unmet care needs, based on professional assessment and consent. Link clinical follow-up with social-service referrals, medication-access assistance and transport or outreach where needed. Give caregivers a clear contact and escalation route without substituting untrained relatives for professional care.
Offer new and returning residents a voluntary skills assessment through existing employment services.
Offer new and returning residents a voluntary skills assessment through existing employment services. Prioritise recognition guidance, short bridging courses and paid placements requested by employers. Make services accessible to similarly situated local jobseekers, and separate regulated-profession licensing from general employment support. Begin with sectors where employers can demonstrate real vacancies.
The count includes distinct documents whose content was retrieved and checked for relevance to this profile. Translations, duplicate links and generic homepages are excluded. A document may support more than one topic when its content is relevant to each. Historical documents retain their original dates; they do not establish that a project or policy remains unchanged today.
Filters use the source date recorded in this library. Indicator reference periods are shown separately.
Two observations from the same WDI age-share series.
These international-series estimates are age shares, not employed-person counts or pension eligibility. Intermediate years are not plotted.
| Observation | Value · % of population | Reference period | Status | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 12.34 | 2020 | Estimate | |
| 2025 | 14.44 | 2025 | Estimate |
The detail below uses WDI/UN demographic estimates and ILO modeled labour series, not national census counts or a merged population total. Common-year comparisons preserve the distinction between labour-force participation, employment and age composition.
On smaller screens, scroll the table sideways to compare all three countries.
| Indicator | 🇦🇲 Armenia | 🇦🇿 Azerbaijan | 🇬🇪 Georgia |
|---|---|---|---|
| Female labour-force participation, age 15+% of female population aged 15+Read with stated qualifications | 51.1 % of female population aged 15+2025EstimateSource 1Source 2 | 60.8 % of female population aged 15+2025EstimateSource 1Source 2 | 56.7 % of female population aged 15+2025EstimateSource 1Source 2Source 3 |
| Male labour-force participation, age 15+% of male population aged 15+Read with stated qualifications | 69.5 % of male population aged 15+2025EstimateSource 1Source 2 | 66.0 % of male population aged 15+2025EstimateSource 1Source 2 | 73.5 % of male population aged 15+2025EstimateSource 1Source 2Source 3 |
| Urban population share% of total populationRead with stated qualifications | 65.9 % of total population2025EstimateSource | 58.6 % of total population2025EstimateSource | 61.2 % of total population2025EstimateSource |
| Older-age dependency ratiopersons per 100 people aged 15–64Matched period and definition | 21.7 persons per 100 people aged 15–642025EstimateSource | 13.2 persons per 100 people aged 15–642025EstimateSource | 25.2 persons per 100 people aged 15–642025EstimateSource |
| Child-age dependency ratiopersons per 100 people aged 15–64Matched period and definition | 28.5 persons per 100 people aged 15–642025EstimateSource | 30.4 persons per 100 people aged 15–642025EstimateSource | 32.3 persons per 100 people aged 15–642025EstimateSource |
| Life expectancy at birthyearsMatched period and definition | 78.3 years2024EstimateSource | 74.6 years2024EstimateSource | 74.7 years2024EstimateSource |
ILO modeled female labour force—employed plus unemployed—divided by female population aged 15+. Participation is not employment. Same WDI model series and year, but not interchangeable with national LFS. ILO may retain older definitions to avoid breaks; Georgia changed national standards in 2020. No complete country-specific reconciliation of the model-to-survey gaps is established here.
This is a common-age modeled participation comparison. It can prompt Armenian investigation of barriers, but does not prove that care services alone explain the difference or that every non-participant seeks work.
ILO modeled male labour force—employed plus unemployed—divided by male population aged 15+; the same age threshold as the female series. Same WDI model series and year, but not interchangeable with national LFS. ILO may retain older definitions to avoid breaks; Georgia changed national standards in 2020. No complete country-specific reconciliation of the model-to-survey gaps is established here.
Read together with the female row and employment ratios. Participation includes unemployed jobseekers and is not a count of immediately available skilled labour.
UN-smoothed population series using each country’s national urban definition; urban boundaries and classifications are not identical. Common year and WDI/UN compilation, but each country retains its national urban classification; compare with qualification.
National urban definitions differ, so the percentages do not identify identical settlement types or service access. Armenian programmes need location-specific evidence.
Population aged 65+ per 100 people aged 15–64, using the WDI/UN population series; not a pensioner-to-worker ratio. Same international modeled/estimated series and reference year; it does not replace national survey or census results.
Older-age pressure differs from child-related demand. Armenia should plan accessible health and care using actual local needs; this is not a pensioner-to-employed-worker ratio.
Population under 15 per 100 people aged 15–64. It describes age composition, not the cost or quality of childcare and schooling. Same international modeled/estimated series and reference year; it does not replace national survey or census results.
The indicator separates age composition from fertility targets and school quality. It supports broad planning, not an obligation for households to change family decisions.
Period life expectancy: expected years if that year’s mortality patterns persisted; not the observed lifetime of a birth cohort. Same international modeled/estimated series and reference year; it does not replace national survey or census results.
The common 2024 estimate describes mortality conditions, not healthy life expectancy, personal prognosis or healthcare-system performance alone.
Labour rows are ILO modeled estimates for age 15+, whereas age-dependency ratios use ages 15–64 as the denominator. UN population estimates and national census-rebased series may differ; they must not be spliced. Urban definitions remain national. Life expectancy uses the common 2024 observation, while the other rows use 2025; it is not a forecast of an individual’s lifespan.
All values are rounded to one decimal; original precision and indicator metadata are retained in the research notes. Source counts do not imply independent corroboration.
Several countries or indicators can share one underlying data release. Multiple source links do not mean independent confirmation.
These dated records preserve the earlier research edition. Later source releases and statistical revisions are reflected in the detailed analysis above.
Reference period: 2025 midyear estimate, World Development Indicators
The World Bank reports 3,086,700 people for 2025. Its total-population indicator uses a de facto resident definition and midyear estimates; this is not a 2026 census count.
Reference period: Registered refugee cohort at end-2024
UNICEF reported 115,388 registered refugees from the September 2023 flight and preceding Lachin evacuations, including about 36,000 children. This is not Armenia's total population or all refugee cohorts.
Reference period: Strategy horizon 2024–2040; adoption confirmed, outcomes not assessed
The government approved the strategy on 17 October 2024. UNFPA describes its focus on human capital, family conditions and healthy ageing rather than population totals alone.
This is a curated starting collection, not an exhaustive country database or a live feed. Each record identifies its reference period and links to original evidence. “Announced” does not mean funded, ratified or operational; those distinctions are stated in the text. Armenia implications are editorial analysis, not source quotations. Census counts, population estimates and forecasts must not be treated as interchangeable. Source-check dates do not change the underlying data period.