"Hayk's Arrow" Armenian Strategic Center
Georgia combines a hydro-heavy electricity system with an expanding role in regional transmission.
Georgia combines a hydro-heavy electricity system with an expanding role in regional transmission. Its value for Armenia depends on seasonal availability, operational interconnections and workable commercial arrangements, not simply the size of proposed generation. The source library follows the operator’s infrastructure history and separates completed assets, construction, contracts and studies. Plans for the Black Sea and transit to Türkiye are strategically important but do not automatically create Armenian access.
ESCO’s 2025 monthly balance makes hydro categories and trade seasonality visible. Values are GWh; annual imports and exports describe different months and cannot be treated as a continuously available surplus for Armenia.
| Indicator | Value and reference period |
|---|---|
| Total reported generationESCO headline total generation; not customer supply and not installed capacity. | 13,837.7 GWh2025Reported result[37] |
| Thermal generationThermal power-station output in the annual balance. | 2,767.1 GWh2025Reported result[37] |
| Kartli wind generationReported Kartli wind-plant output; future wind projects are excluded. | 79.4 GWh2025Reported result[37] |
| Regulatory hydro generationESCO’s regulatory hydro category; not a guarantee that the entire annual volume can be dispatched in a chosen month. | 5,238.2 GWh2025Reported result[37] |
| Seasonal hydro generationESCO’s seasonal hydro category, separate from regulatory and small hydro. | 4,675.6 GWh2025Reported result[37] |
| Small-hydro generationESCO’s small-hydro category; rounded hydro subcategories differ by 0.1 GWh from the published hydro total. | 1,072.9 GWh2025Reported result[37] |
| Annual electricity exportsAnnual outward flow in ESCO’s balance; electricity transit of 665.3 GWh is separately listed and is not added as Georgian generation or exports. | 511.2 GWh2025Reported result[37] |
| Supply to consumersESCO’s supply-to-consumers line; distinct from total consumption of 14,884.1 GWh, which includes other balance items. | 14,336.3 GWh2025Reported result[37] |
| Imports concentrated in five cold monthsJanuary–March plus November–December imports: 1,382.483 / annual 1,557.5 GWh. These are five calendar months, not one continuous winter season. | 88.8% of annual imports2025Reported result[37] |
| Exports concentrated in May–JuneMay–June exports: 436.220 / annual 511.2 GWh; concentration computed from the displayed monthly and annual figures. | 85.3% of annual exports2025Reported result[37] |
Georgia’s hydro-heavy balance makes the timing of trade as important as its annual volume. Most 2025 imports were concentrated in January–March and November–December, while May and June accounted for most exports. Armenia should test whether its own seasonal deficit coincides with Georgian import demand before treating Georgian hydro as a diversification reserve. The practical requirement is a joint monthly balance with dry-year cases, planned outages, transfer limits and priced delivery periods; a single annual net-trade figure cannot answer that question. [37]
Regulatory, seasonal and small hydro should remain separate in Armenian procurement analysis because they describe different parts of the generating fleet, without by themselves proving firm availability. The 2025 balance also distinguishes Georgian generation, consumer supply and electricity transit. Armenia should preserve those categories in any interconnection business case and verify an actual supplier, dispatch rights and delivery contract. The computed 4.6 GWh gap between the headline generation total and the listed technology totals is an accounting reconciliation residual, not evidence of a solar fleet. [37]
National statistical coverage differs from the other countries. Listed thermal 2,767.1 + wind 79.4 + hydro 10,986.6 = 13,833.1 GWh, leaving a computed 4.6 GWh reconciliation residual against 13,837.7. No technology is assigned to it. Monthly sums and rounded annual totals can differ slightly; this is not a forecast of future trade. [37]
For Armenia, the first Georgian energy decision is continuity planning across an existing transit relationship, followed by commercial testing of additional flexibility.
For Armenia, the first Georgian energy decision is continuity planning across an existing transit relationship, followed by commercial testing of additional flexibility. The retained gas-security account is a 2024 description, not verification of today's contractual allocation or an interruption. ESCO's 2025 electricity balance separately shows pronounced monthly variation in imports and exports. These sources support testing coincident seasonal pressure; neither proves that a Georgian partner has spare gas or electricity available when Armenia needs it. Operational rights must therefore be confirmed before assigning reliability value. [172][37][173]
The gas-recovery recommendation ranks first because mapping Armenia's own notification, decision and contractual responsibilities is possible before a foreign partner agrees to a rehearsal. It can expose an actionable domestic gap without purchasing a new asset. The objective is not another protocol for its own sake: it is clarity on who may take each necessary decision, which supplier or operator must assent, and what Armenia must plan to do when that assent or information is unavailable. [172][173]
Proposed horizons run from authorisation. Later stages depend on the conditions below; these are analytical choices, not adopted deadlines or funding commitments.
In the proposed first 90 days, responsible Armenian entities should review current contracts and authorised contacts privately, distinguish domestic decisions from supplier and transit decisions, and list unresolved obligations. Request a joint tabletop exercise only through competent entities. If the request is declined, record the gap in Armenia's seasonal planning rather than describe cross-border recovery as assured. [172][173]
Over 3–12 months, close the domestic procedural gaps and test a voluntary demand-flexibility arrangement if the Armenian regulator authorises it. In parallel, price a limited seasonal electricity exchange only against confirmed existing transfer limits, counterpart agreement and settlement obligations. Compare the two responses for the same critical periods, including rebound demand and curtailment rather than annual energy alone. [37][22][27]
After 12 months, use verified performance and indicative onward-access terms to judge export-dependent generation. Separate the business case from any proposed interconnector or Black Sea capacity that is not yet usable. Keep domestic value in the appraisal: a project that remains worthwhile under delayed export access is less exposed than one whose financing depends on an unconfirmed foreign route. [46][89][16]
The binding constraint is the combination of current contractual authority, usable technical capacity and the cost of maintaining a fallback. Armenia cannot unilaterally allocate a supplier's gas or a Georgian operator's reserve. Staff with access to contracts and qualified system analysis are needed before procurement. Retain sensitive operational detail with the competent entities; public reporting can explain which categories of obligation are verified without revealing vulnerable network arrangements. [172][37]
If the contractual map and recovery procedures are already complete and tested, repeating the exercise has low value. Prioritise a bounded seasonal electricity pilot when current capacity and delivered economics are confirmed, or domestic flexibility when foreign access remains uncertain. Neither substitutes automatically for fuel continuity. Reorder the response when technical analysis shows which service is actually at risk and which option can protect it at an acceptable total cost. [37][22][172]
Georgia’s 2025 balance concentrated electricity imports in winter and exports in the wetter months. For Armenia, this creates a possible exchange opportunity, but also a risk that both systems seek energy simultaneously. The economic mechanism is the difference between the price and availability of power in a particular hour, plus transmission and balancing costs; an annual hydro share cannot establish it. Armenian plant maintenance and demand patterns could either complement or coincide with Georgian shortages. A useful response is a small, fully costed seasonal transaction using verified existing transfer capability, with settlement and reserve duties agreed before delivery. This is a proposed commercial test, not evidence that additional interconnector capacity is operational. [37][89][114]
Georgia’s gas system carries Russian gas toward Armenia while also supplying Georgian consumers and thermal generation. The ministry’s 2024 security statement describes a diversion node that can reduce onward Armenian volumes when used for Georgia’s system. That is a physical interaction, not evidence of a current interruption or an automatic right to curtail Armenian supply. Armenia’s exposure therefore involves both upstream supply and transit operations. Cold weather, maintenance or a pipeline failure could require rapid coordination across different legal and operating entities. A jointly rehearsed notification and recovery procedure would reduce uncertainty about responsibilities without assuming that Georgia can guarantee the original supplier’s performance. [172][173]
The Black Sea cable preparation and the Azerbaijan–Türkiye transit arrangement illustrate Georgia’s developing role as an electricity gateway. Armenia could benefit only if it secures compatible access through every necessary interface. The retained sources distinguish existing Akhaltsikhe equipment, postponed Armenia–Georgia project deadlines and proposed cable capacity. Those assets and plans cannot be added into a single available Armenian export route. A future project can improve Armenia’s options while simultaneously attracting competing users. The appropriate Armenian response is to obtain indicative capacity, cost and curtailment terms before dedicating new generation or public support to that route, while preserving domestic flexibility that remains useful if the route is delayed. [46][4][59][89][16]
ESCO’s 2025 balance records 13,837.7 GWh of domestic electricity generation, including 10,986.6 GWh of hydropower—about 79.4 percent of the total. Electricity imports were 1,557.5 GWh. These annual figures show the system’s hydro orientation but cannot establish whether electricity was available for export in a particular winter month or hour. [37]
The monthly distribution makes seasonality concrete. In 2025 January and February together accounted for 722.6 GWh of imports, about 46 percent of the annual total. Hydropower in June was 1,327.5 GWh, roughly three times February’s 442.2 GWh. May and June supplied 436.2 GWh of exports, about 85 percent of annual exports. Armenia consequently faces a neighbour whose summer sales and winter purchases differ sharply. The possible complementarity comes from matching that cycle to Armenian plant availability, not from treating Georgia’s annual hydro share as firm year-round export capacity. [37][155][163]
Electricity generation is only part of the energy balance. IRENA’s April 2025 assessment finds domestic production supplying less than one quarter of total primary energy, despite the hydro-dominated power system. Natural gas represents over half of energy imports and oil products about one third. High hydroelectric output therefore does not establish overall energy independence. [175]
GSE’s April 2026 account describes the Ruisi wind plant as under construction: 33 turbines and 206 MW planned capacity. Four 220 kV bays at the substation were in testing and four connecting lines, totalling nine kilometres, were nearing completion. The announced three-stage grid connection was expected by year-end, not recorded as already complete. [6][26]
The Armenian implication is that new generation and usable cross-border supply are separate propositions. Wind capacity may diversify Georgia’s hydro exposure, yet exportable energy also depends on balancing, curtailment and transmission constraints. Connection progress at substations is thus a better near-term signal than a project’s headline megawatts alone, especially for prospective commercial exchanges. [6][26][58][73][81]
Georgia’s adopted National Energy and Climate Plan sets a 2030 renewable-energy target of 27.4 percent of gross final energy consumption. Its sectoral targets are 85 percent for electricity, 10.45 percent for transport and 7 percent for heating and cooling. These different denominators and future targets must remain separate from measured annual generation shares. [174]
In June 2026 GSE announced a GEL65.96 million tender covering double-circuit upgrades of the 220 kV Liakhvi and Urbnisi lines and reconstruction of the Lomisi line. The stated works period was eighteen months after contract signing. Its December 2025 Stori–New Telavi contract concerned a separate 110 kV connection for approximately 47.6 MW. [3][5][9][14][57]
These investments address internal bottlenecks before additional generation can serve domestic or external customers. Armenia benefits only where improved Georgian capacity connects to an accessible bilateral route; a stronger line elsewhere is not equivalent to extra Armenian import capacity. Procurement, commissioning and actual power-transfer limits therefore represent successive, materially different stages of the investment pipeline. [21][35][39][40]
The May 2026 agreement between GSE and SOCAR sets key terms for electricity transit from Azerbaijan to Türkiye through Georgia. GSE states that the twenty-year arrangement takes effect on 1 January 2027, with the tariff predetermined for the first three years. Separately, Georgian and Armenian system operators met in November 2025 to discuss cooperation. [4][16][89][114][143]
This strengthens the importance of Georgia’s network as a commercial corridor, while demonstrating that access is negotiated through specific arrangements. Armenia’s interests include transparent capacity allocation, compatible system rules and predictable tariffs. The operator meeting establishes a channel of dialogue, but it is not itself evidence of an Armenian transit entitlement or a concluded supply contract. [89][114][143]
The World Bank approved US$35 million in May 2024 for preparatory work on the Black Sea submarine connection. GSE subsequently reported Project of Mutual Interest status and a proposed 1,155 km connection with 1,300 MW capacity in April 2026. Preparation and regulatory recognition improve project readiness; neither establishes a completed cable or available trading capacity. [8][46]
For Armenia, the strategic possibility is access to a wider electricity market through Georgia rather than direct geographical participation in the cable. Realising it would require sufficient upstream interconnection, contractual access and acceptable economics. Different regional “green corridor” proposals also have different configurations; their advertised capacities should not be added together as if one physical project already existed. [15][24][33][34][36]
GSE’s September 2025 storage consultation identified its Ksani 500 substation as the location for a planned battery connection and linked storage to greater wind and solar integration. The operator’s network plans and market discussions place flexibility alongside new lines. These records describe technical preparation and institutional coordination; they do not provide a measured storage-service output. [22][27][66][77][90]
For Armenia, better Georgian balancing capability could make exchanges more reliable and diversify the services available across the border. Its value will depend on procurement rules, dispatch arrangements and who pays for reserve availability. Tracking system services together with generation avoids overstating the security benefit of a new power plant that cannot reliably deliver at the needed time. [27][29][31][66][72][77][87][90]
The limited voluntary day-ahead and intraday markets launched in 2024 did not complete market reform. The Energy Community’s November 2025 report places balancing and ancillary-service operation by a planned deadline of 1 July 2027, superseding the earlier July 2025 schedule. Its assessment still describes monthly balancing settlement; the future deadline is not evidence of an operational hourly market. [174][43]
The same 2025 assessment records a national energy-poverty target of 15 percent by 2030, against a stated 43 percent baseline in 2017. It also reports no nationwide energy-poverty dataset and no definition in national legislation. The target is consequently not an observed current poverty rate or proof that the intended reduction has occurred. [174]
Georgia’s hydroelectric profile conceals substantial gas dependence. The ministry’s 2024 security statement reports that imports supplied 99.5 percent of gas demand in 2023. Azerbaijan provided 2.457 billion cubic metres through SOCAR and Shah Deniz arrangements, Russia 596.0 million, and domestic production only 15.8 million. This dependence extends into electricity: ESCO records 2,767.1 GWh of thermal generation in 2025, concentrated more heavily in cold months. Imported gas therefore backs up the hydro system exactly when winter electricity demand and low river flows can tighten the balance. [172][37]
The ownership and operating chain separates these risks. State-owned GOGC is the sole founding partner of the company owning the main gas-pipeline system; GGTC holds the transportation licence and operates the network, including Russian transit to Armenia. SOCAR subsidiaries are major suppliers and dominate distribution outside Tbilisi, while Tbilisi Energy serves much of the capital. A commercial dispute with a distributor, a failure in the state transport network and an upstream supply interruption are therefore different events, even when all appear to consumers as a gas shortage. [172]
Gas transit gives Georgia an immediate role in Armenian energy security. GOGC’s annual series reports North-South transit of 2.599 billion cubic metres in 2022, 2.360 billion in 2023, 2.288 billion in 2024 and 2.229 billion in 2025. Over the same period the South Caucasus route expanded to 22.933 billion cubic metres in 2025. These are distinct pipelines and commercial flows. Greater Azerbaijan–Türkiye transit does not itself replace the Russian supply route serving Armenia, but it changes the scale of Georgia’s wider gas-transit business. [173][172]
The Marneuli–Ayrum history illustrates why an identified project is not equivalent to usable capacity. Georgian and Armenian officials discussed a back-to-back station in Ayrum in 2016. A later amendment explicitly postponed construction and commissioning deadlines for the line and converter links, describing two 350 MW units on the Armenian side. A 2025 operator meeting renewed cooperation without reporting that this whole configuration had entered service. The record supports a sustained project relationship and revised deadlines, not a verified 700 MW operating Armenian entitlement. [143][89][114][16]
An operating interface elsewhere has a different evidential status. GSE’s 2023 account described two installed 350 MW HVDC units at Akhaltsikhe, while a third unit remained planned. Such converters enable exchange between systems with different synchronous arrangements, but access still requires capacity and commercial allocation. Armenia’s route to a Turkish or future Black Sea buyer would therefore combine several interfaces: its Georgian connection, internal Georgian transfer capability and the onward border connection. The weakest available interface constrains the whole transaction. [59][72][89][46]
The gas-security statement adds a specific emergency interaction: a node near the Red Bridge can redirect Russian transit gas into Georgia’s domestic system, reducing gas delivered toward Armenia when used. This is a described physical trade-off, not evidence of an actual 2026 interruption. Joint contingency procedures and transparent notification would consequently benefit both countries. For electricity, coordinated maintenance and seasonal exchanges can provide a similar shared benefit; for gas, the priority is preserving reliable transit during simultaneous winter demand stress. [172][114][16]
Low winter hydropower and imported gas dependence can tighten Georgian supply at the same time that Armenia seeks reliable energy exchange. [37][172]
Repeated changes to interconnection and market-opening schedules can delay Armenian access despite substantial announced megawatts. [89][77][43]
Seasonal electricity exchange and coordinated reserves could complement Georgia’s hydro cycle and Armenian plant availability. [37][114]
Transparent transit and eventual additional interconnection could widen Armenia’s commercial options through Georgia if capacity and contracts are secured. [89][16][46]
These scenarios explore how documented drivers could affect Armenia. They are conditional analytical paths, not predictions or assigned probabilities.
If operators secure usable transfer capacity, balancing rules and seasonal contracts, Armenia could import Georgian wet-season electricity and offer supply or reserve services in other periods. The gain depends on complementary availability and prices, not simply installed capacity. [37][114][16]
If low hydropower coincides with constrained gas supply, both countries could face greater competition for available energy and tighter transit management. Prior emergency coordination would matter because the Georgian gas system contains a described diversion interface affecting onward Armenian volumes. [172][37]
Priority signals are commissioning of Ruisi connections, award and progress of the Shida Kartli works, the January 2027 transit start, the next financing and implementation decisions for the Black Sea cable, and concrete Georgian–Armenian operating arrangements. Seasonal generation and imports should be checked alongside each infrastructure milestone. [3][4][6][8][10][15]
These are analytical recommendations based on the evidence, not adopted government decisions or commitments by the named institutions. Timelines and measures below are proposed implementation tests.
Armenian gas entities should first map their notification and dispatch responsibilities, then request a joint tabletop exercise with GGTC and the relevant supplier.
Armenian gas entities should first map their notification and dispatch responsibilities, then request a joint tabletop exercise with GGTC and the relevant supplier. Test a winter pressure loss, maintenance delay and diversion-node use; agree contacts, information fields and restoration sequencing.
Prepare an Armenian hourly supply-and-demand offer using existing plant schedules, then invite GSE and eligible traders to price a limited seasonal exchange.
Prepare an Armenian hourly supply-and-demand offer using existing plant schedules, then invite GSE and eligible traders to price a limited seasonal exchange. Require written transfer limits, metering, settlement, imbalance responsibility and curtailment order before scheduling any delivery.
Identify willing Armenian large consumers able to shift non-essential electricity demand without compromising safety.
Identify willing Armenian large consumers able to shift non-essential electricity demand without compromising safety. Design a voluntary, metered trial with baseline consumption, notice periods and compensation rules; obtain domestic regulatory approval before any dispatch or payment.
Prepare a standard Armenian request for onward electricity access through Georgia, separating current assets from proposed upgrades.
Prepare a standard Armenian request for onward electricity access through Georgia, separating current assets from proposed upgrades. Seek indicative transmission charges, capacity allocation, balancing and curtailment terms from each relevant operator before supporting a project justified by Turkish or Black Sea sales.
The count includes distinct documents whose content was retrieved and checked for relevance to this profile. Translations, duplicate links and generic homepages are excluded. A document may support more than one topic when its content is relevant to each. Historical documents retain their original dates; they do not establish that a project or policy remains unchanged today.
Filters use the source date recorded in this library. Indicator reference periods are shown separately.
Operator-reported transit toward Armenia.
These are annual transit volumes in the North–South operator series, not total Georgian gas consumption or South Caucasus Pipeline volumes.
| Observation | Value · Billion m³ | Reference period | Status | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 2.599 | 2022 | Reported result | |
| 2023 | 2.36 | 2023 | Reported result | |
| 2024 | 2.288 | 2024 | Reported result | |
| 2025 | 2.229 | 2025 | Reported result |
The comparison uses the same calendar year and separates annual output from capacity, primary energy and trade. Shares are calculated from each source’s reported generation total; national coverage differences remain visible.
On smaller screens, scroll the table sideways to compare all three countries.
| Indicator | 🇦🇲 Armenia | 🇦🇿 Azerbaijan | 🇬🇪 Georgia |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reported annual electricity generationGWhRead with stated qualifications | 10,010.3 GWh2025EstimateSource | 28,683.0 GWh2025Reported resultSource | 13,837.7 GWh2025Reported resultSource |
| Thermal / fuel-based share% of annual generationRead with stated qualifications | 33.57%2025EstimateSource | 86.62%2025Reported resultSource | 20.00%2025Reported resultSource |
| Hydro share of reported generation% of annual generationRead with stated qualifications | 21.04%2025EstimateSource | 9.91%2025Reported resultSource | 79.40%2025Reported resultSource |
| Wind share of reported generation% of annual generationRead with stated qualifications | 0.01%2025EstimateSource | 0.60%2025Reported resultSource | 0.57%2025Reported resultSource |
| Solar share: identified coverage% of annual generation where separately identifiedNot directly comparable | 16.25%2025EstimateSource | 2.09%2025Reported resultSource | Not separately identified2025Reported resultSource |
Headline physical electricity production, not primary energy, installed capacity, net customer supply or export capacity. Same year and physical energy unit, but national coverage is not fully harmonized: Armenia includes estimated autonomous onsite use, Azerbaijan separates fuel autoproducers, and Georgia uses ESCO balance categories with a small unresolved residual.
Armenia’s smaller annual total makes outage timing and reserve sharing material; these totals do not establish firm regional supply available to it.
Same year and physical energy unit, but national coverage is not fully harmonized: Armenia includes estimated autonomous onsite use, Azerbaijan separates fuel autoproducers, and Georgia uses ESCO balance categories with a small unresolved residual.
Georgia’s 4.6 GWh computed reconciliation residual is not assigned to solar or another technology. Missing classification is not zero production. Armenian autonomous onsite use is an estimate.
No generation total or share establishes a supplier, contract, open border transfer capacity or firm electricity deliverable to Armenia in a particular hour.
Several countries or indicators can share one underlying data release. Multiple source links do not mean independent confirmation.
These dated records preserve the earlier research edition. Later source releases and statistical revisions are reflected in the detailed analysis above.
Reference period: Calendar year 2025; ESCO electricity balance
ESCO reports 13,837.7 GWh of generation in 2025, including 10,986.6 GWh from hydropower. Imports were 1,557.5 GWh. These figures describe electricity, not Georgia's total energy supply or fuel dependence.
Reference period: First-phase financing approval in 2024
On 21 May 2024, the World Bank approved $35 million for the first ESPIRE phase, including preparatory work for a potential Georgia–Romania electricity and fibre-optic connection. Financing preparation is not evidence of an operating cable.
This is a curated starting collection, not an exhaustive country database or a live feed. Each record identifies its reference period and links to original evidence. “Announced” does not mean funded, ratified or operational; those distinctions are stated in the text. Armenia implications are editorial analysis, not source quotations. Census counts, population estimates and forecasts must not be treated as interchangeable. Source-check dates do not change the underlying data period.